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Chapter 1: Problem Statement and State of the Art
1.1 Resilience History
The term resilience applies to a broad range of subjects in the social sciences,
natural sciences, and engineering. Alexander [2013] traced the etymological roots
of resilience to ancient Rome where the terms resilire and resilio were found in the
writings of such luminaries as Ovid, Cicero, and Pliny the Elder. Sir Francis Bacon
described the loudness of echoes with the word resilience in an English translation
of his Latin text Sylva Sylvarum. In the 19th century, Rankine used resilience as
the term for the mathematical definition of “spring” in steel beams. The use of
resilience to describe material properties such as ductility and stiffness spread to
other industries such as textiles and watchmaking [Alexander, 2013]. In the 1950s
psychology introduced resilience to describe the mindsets of traumatized youths
[Goldstein and Brooks, 2012].
C. S. Holling’s 1973 seminal paper, “Resilience and the stability of ecologi-
cal systems,” formed the basis for much of the current socio-ecological and socio-
technical research in resilience. The paper established the concept of resilience in a
dynamic system framework. Achieving ecological resilience departed from the tra-
ditional ecological management goal of establishing a stable equilibrium within the
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environment to maximize resource extraction. Holling’s resilience focused on the
persistence of relationships, such as those among predator and prey, rather than
stable populations. Holling proposed that relationships with large variability may
persist through large disturbances in their environment while the low variability,
stable relationships would not persist through large disturbances.
Ecology defined two types of resilience: engineering resilience and ecological
resilience. In this paradigm, engineering resilience is focused upon steady-state equi-
librium among the functions as measured by the outputs of a system of components.
Holling’s proposed measures of engineering resilience were total deviation from the
steady-state after a disturbance and the time to return to steady-state [Holling,
1973].
Ecological resilience focused upon survival of the relationships, or regimes of
behavior of the components in the system. Under ecological resilience, the systems
may experience great variation over time, but the system operates under the same
regime of behavior after disturbances. A proposed measure of resilience was the
magnitude of disturbance required to move the system into a new regime of behavior
[Holling, 2010, 1973].
The resilience concept in ecology led to development of the adaptive man-
agement decision framework. Under adaptive management, local managers based
decisions upon accruing systemic knowledge, reducing uncertainties, increasing the
ecological resilience of the system. Adaptive management achieved success for com-
plex systems requiring urgent action in the presence of uncertainty [Garmestani
et al., 2008].
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1.2 The Need for Resilience Models for Engineered Systems
Multiple stakeholders of complex systems have identified resilience as a key
concept to support decision-making among courses of action. Presidential Policy
Directive 21 presented the case for resilience in critical infrastructure systems [PPD
(Presidential Policy Directive), 2013]. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction sponsored numerous documents and campaigns aimed to improve re-
silience around the world [UNISDR, 2015, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2015].
Academia, professional societies, and major organizations have recognized the
demand for resilience quantification through panels, conferences, and published pa-
pers. Hosseini et al. [2015] showed an order of magnitude increase in the prevalence
of papers covering resilience topics from 2000 to 2015. Society for Risk Analysis
entitled its 2016 national symposium, “Risk and Resilience: Viva la Revolución!”
[Society for Risk Analysis, 2016]. In 2015, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology started the Community Resilience Level to address resilience concerns at
a local level [National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2016]. IEEE
has sponsored an annual resilience symposium since 2008 [Idaho National Labora-
tories, 2017]. The American Society of Civil Engineers established an infrastructure
resilience division to, “. . . develop a unified approach in advancing the concepts of
resiliency within lifeline and infrastructure systems” [American Society of Civil En-
gineers, 2017].
The U.S. Government, the DoD in particular, recognizes resilience as a key
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aspect of the DoD’s strategy for assuring mission success[Goerger et al., 2014, Hol-
land, 2014, Neches, 2011, 2012]. The current National Security Strategy of the U.S.
places a priority on increasing the resilience of government functions [Trump, 2017]
building upon earlier Presidential Policy Directives defining the future posture of
critical infrastructure systems. [PPD (Presidential Policy Directive), 2011, 2013].
The DoD defined mission assurance as, “. . . a process to protect or ensure the con-
tinued function and resilience of capabilities and assets by refining, integrating and
synchronizing all aspects of the DoD . . . ” [Department of Defense, 2016]
The Department of Defense (DoD) in the United States manages an incred-
ible number of complicated systems that must operate in austere and unforgiving
environments while being sustained for long periods of time. Stakeholders expect
new acquisitions to be more capable than predecessors. The difficulties surrounding
DoD acquisition often lead to delays in the initial operational capability (IOC) and
full operational capability (FOC) of the systems. Examples of delayed acquisitions
include the F-35 [Werner, 2018], the Zumwalt class of destroyers [Katz, 2018], the
KC-46 tanker aircraft [Mehta, 2016], and U.S. Army command and control systems
[Edwards, 2017].
DoD program managers must make decisions under great uncertainty with
long-term effects on the viability of the system over its life-span [Burgess, 2015]. The
DoD acquires and operates many different complex systems, such as aircraft, ships,
satellite constellations, and base infrastructure. These systems often have life-spans
measured in decades. For example, three generations of pilots have flown the same
B-52 bomber airframe [W.J. Hennigan, 2013]. Uncertainties affecting the system
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over its lifecycle include changing operational demands, operational environments,
training requirements, maintenance practices, budgetary constraints, and end of life
activities.
Aging systems must operate past their planned lifetimes to compensate for
these delays. This life extension has reliability, safety, and operational implications.
One method to mitigate the challenges of aging systems is a System Life Extension
Program (SLEP). A SLEP extends the lifetime and often adds capability to an ag-
ing system. Many government systems are undergoing SLEP including the Army
Tactical Missile System [The Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evalua-
tion, 2017, Zacks Equity Research, 2015], Landing Craft-Air Cushioned [Naval Sea
Systems Command, 2018], weather radars [Radar Operations Center, 2018], ships
[Eckstein, 2018], and aircraft [Garbarino, 2018, Jennings, 2018, Lockheed Martin
Public Relations, 2017, Tirpak, 2015]. For example, the F/A-18 tactical strike-
fighter aircraft faces a staggering backlog of maintenance resulting from years of
unforeseen demand coupled with budget shortfalls and acquisition delays over the
past fifteen years [LaGrone, 2016]. To meet demand, some variants have had their
life extended from 6,000 to 10,000 flight hours. A service life extension program
(SLEP) is a solution for a system nearing its operational limit when no replacement
system is available [Bartkus, 2002, Broadstreet, 2007, Tirpak, 2016, Toussaint and
Collery, 2012]. Figure 1.1 shows an F/A-18 under repair at the Fleet Readiness
Center in North Island, CA.
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Figure 1.1: F/A-18 undergoing repairs at the depot in NAS North Island,
CA [Staff Sgt. Gabriela Garcia, 2016]
1.3 Definitions
This study focused upon the performance of a system. The International
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines a system as, “. . . a construct or
collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable by the
elements alone.” Elements of a system may include hardware, software, processes,
people, infrastructure, or records. Law [Law, 2015] defines a system as “a collection
of entities, e.g., people or machines, that act and interact together toward the ac-
complishment of some logical end.” A system of systems comprises, “. . . large-scale
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integrated systems that are heterogeneous and independently operable on their own,
but are networked together for a common goal” [Jamshidi, 2009]. A collection of
variables defines the state of a system. Metrics quantify the values of the state
variables. Metric examples include time, probability, length, resilience, robustness,
and figure of merit. This study reserved the term metric as a value assigned to a
concept [Ayyub and Klir, 2006].
The definitions emphasized a system’s purpose, desired output, or logical end.
Stakeholders in the system define the system’s purpose. A stakeholder is an en-
tity that has an interest in the existence, performance, outcome and future of some
system [Aven, 2003, Ayyub, 2014c, Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Freeman, 1984,
Mitroff, 1983]. The Stanford Research Institute first defined stakeholders as, “those
groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” (quoted in
[Freeman, 1984]). Table 1.1 lists examples of systems, system outputs, and stake-
holders.
Models represent a system’s internal relationships, inputs, and outputs with
the intent to understand the system behavior and predict outcomes by reducing a
system to characteristics of interest. A model may be physical, such as a scaled-down
replica, or symbolic, such as a diagram or mathematical expression [INCOSE, 2017,
Law, 2015]. Analytic models provide a closed-form solution represented as a math-
ematical expression. Simulation models solve problems through, “. . . numerically
exercising the model for the inputs in question to see how they affect the output
measures of performance” [Law, 2015] that are too complex to calculate a result di-
rectly either because it is impossible or too computationally expensive. This study
7




































uses model interchangeably with analytical model and simulation for simulation
model.
1.4 Resilience
The Society for Risk Analysis provided a operational definition of resilience:
[Society for Risk Analysis, 2016]:
Resilience is the ability of a system to reduce the initial adverse effects
(absorptive capability) of a disruptive event (stress) and the time/speed
and costs at which it is able to return to an appropriate functional-
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ity/equilibrium (adaptive and restorative capability). The disruptive
events maybe shocking or creeping, endogenous or exogenous.
This statement described the epochs of a cycle of resistance, robustness, and re-
covery. This study also relied heavily upon the definition for resilience, and its
relationship to functional output presented by Ayyub [2014a]:
Resilience notionally means the ability to prepare for and adapt to
changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.
Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from distur-
bances of the deliberate attack types, accidents, or naturally occurring
threats or incidents. The resilience of a system’s function can be mea-
sured based on the persistence of a corresponding functional performance
under uncertainty in the face of disturbances.
The definition required a resilience model to be sensitive to a system’s functional
performance — sometimes called the figure-of-merit [Henry and Ramirez-Marquez,
2012, 2016, Ramirez-Marquez and Rocco S., 2009]. Functional performance is the de-
sired output of the system as defined by its stakeholders. The functional performance
data may come from direct measurement of the system or from a model/simulation
of the sytem. Since informing decisions is a primary motivation for resilience mod-
els, simulation is often the primary source for resilience model input data. The
resilience models used the system’s functional performance to data to measure the
resilience of a system. The resilience models answer the question, “resilience of what
to what?” [Carpenter et al., 2001]
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Figure 1.2: Performance trajectories adapted from Ayyub [2014a]
The resilience definition implies three time phases of resilience, also called
performance segregation [Ayyub, 2015], associated with critical events in the system
time line:
• Resistance phase (before the disturbance)
• Robustness phase (after the disturbance and before recovery)
• Recovery phase (time from recovery to recovery finish
After the end of recovery phase, a new resistance phase begins.
1.4.1 Resistance phase
Resistance is a systems ability to successful fend off attacks and withstand
disturbances without change in functional performance. The resistance phase of
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functional performance occurs prior to a disturbance (t < td). A system may resist
the disturbance with uninterrupted delivery of the functional performance. Time to
failure is a characteristic of interest during this time period. Two well established
techniques support calculation of time to failure are: stress-strength analysis and
reliability analysis. Stress-strength analysis requires knowledge of the intensity and
frequency of stresses and system strength over time [McPherson, 2010]. When fail-
ure data under operational or accelerated conditions, reliability analysis finds the
distribution of the time to failure [Ayyub, 2014c, Modarres et al., 2010, Rausand
and Høyland, 2004]).
1.4.2 Robustness phase
Robustness is the remaining performance after the degradation. The robust-
ness phase occurs after a degradation in functional performance. Robustness com-
prises the failure profile, or trajectory, as well. Failure profiles may be described as
brittle, ductile, or graceful failure. The robustness phase lasts from failure initiation
until recovery initiation. For long life-span systems, the failure time interval may be
insignificant compared to time spent in the normal, degraded, and recovered states,
and may be approximated as a step function in many cases [Ayyub, 2014c].
1.4.3 Recovery Phase
Recovery is the return of functional output to a desired level of performance.
The recovery phase begins after action is taken to restore the degraded system. The
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end of recovery phase can be defined in several ways. Resilience models often end
the resilience phase once a stable level of performance is achieved [Ayyub, 2014a,
Henry and Ramirez-Marquez, 2012, Tran, 2015, Tran et al., 2017]. Ayyub [2015]
defines a time horizon that can be determined by a stakeholder or assigned a value
associated with the underlying system such as the return period of the disturbance.
After the recovery phase, a new resistance phase begins at the new normal level of
performance and ability to overcome disturbances.
1.5 Resilience Modeling State of the Art
The literature contained a wide variety of models intended to measure the
resilience of a wide variety of systems. The resilience models fell into several broad
categories: network resilience models, point-in-time resilience models, and area re-
silience models. Table 1.2 lists common terms that appear regularly in the differ-
ent resilience models. The following discussion modified parameters and variables
from their original publication appearance to present common symbology across the
study.
1.5.1 Point-in-Time Resilience Models
One general method of modeling system resilience used performance values at
critical points in time during the resilience cycle. The performance level prior to the
failure formed a baseline value,ϕ(t0), the minimum performance level captured the
degradation due to the failure, ϕ(td), and the value after restoration activities cap-
12




level of system performance,
output of system as a function of time
t0 Earliest time of interest
ti Time of failure initiation
tf Time of failure completion
td Time of minimum performance





stakeholder need over time
χ(t) Intertemporal substitutability
tured the amount of recovered performance, varphi(tr). Figure 1.3 depicts common
points used in these resilience models.
Quotient resilience was a ratio of differences between performance of the criti-
cal points in the resilience timeline [Gama Dessavre et al., 2016, Henry and Ramirez-





Quotient resilience captured the fraction of recovery achieved relative to the
disrupted state. As such, the model did not capture residual performance after a
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Figure 1.3: General performance and baseline profile for point-in-time models
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makers to decide between recovery actions, but did not allow a decision-maker to
assess the initial effect of the disturbance. Follow-on studies used quotient resilience
to find importance measures for networks [Barker et al., 2013, 2015, Baroud et al.,
2014].
Francis and Bekera [2014] proposed a family of models based upon resilience
factor (ρi):
















In addition to the critical points-in-time, the model included the speed factor,
Sp, to include triage recovery activities in the model. Triage activities resulted
in an intermediate, improved equilibrium state prior to final recovery. The speed
factor for recovery included time between failure and the start of recovery activities
(tr − t∗r ), slack time (tδ), the time to complete the initial recovery actions (t∗r), and
a resilience decay factor applied while the system was in the interim equilibrium
state, F ∗r . The model introduced a fragility term and an event probability term to
resilience factor to account for the random nature of disturbance events and their
associated failures. Fragility was the probability of failure (µ) given a disturbance
event i described by a vector of parameters (z). Taking the fragility, resilience factor,
and the probability of the event i occurring (Pr[Di]), produced the expected system












Figure 1.4: General performance and baseline profile for time interval models
ζ = Pr[Di] · (µ|zi) · ρi(Sp, ϕ(tr), ϕ(td), ϕ(t0)) (1.4)
1.5.2 Time Interval Resilience Models
Another general method to measure the resilience of a system was to compare
the performance over time against the baseline performance over the same time
period. The model was typically a ratio of the areas under the actual performance














Figure 1.5: Resilience triangle
The resilience triangle defined a special case of Figure 1.4 with instantaneous
degradation instantaneously and linear recovery. The missing performance is a
triangular area. Figure 1.5 depicts a loss in performance given a failure with per-
formance returning to the status quo value after recovery [Ayyub, 2014a, Bruneau
et al., 2003, Tierney and Bruneau, 2007, Zobel, 2011].
The resilience triangle (R∆) did not contain the resistance of the system. The






A case with no reduction in performance yielded a resilience value of zero, while the




(tr − tti=td) (1.6)
Zobel [2011] expanded upon the resilience triangle concept to develop the
adjusted resilience triangle, R∆adj . The variables of the adjusted resilience triangle
were the initial loss of functionality, ϕ(td), the time to recover, tr, the failure time
(ti = td), and an upper bound to the time to recovery (t
∗
r). The adjusted resilience
triangle (R∆adj) model was:
R∆adj(ϕ(ti = td), tr) = 1−
ϕ(ti = td)tr
2t∗r
; ϕ(ti = td) ∈ [0, 1], tr ∈ [0, T ∗] (1.7)
As with the original resilience triangle, the adjusted resilience triangle measured
performance did not incorporate resistance. Zobel’s formulation accomodated a
time horizon, albeit implicitly, with the inclusion of t∗r.
Ayyub [2014a] generalized the resilience triangle with the integral resilience
model. Integral resilience removed the resilience triangle constraints for failure and
recovery profiles. Integral resilience also included performance of the system prior
to the disturbance. This enabled consideration of the probabilistic nature of distur-
bances and system failure. The formulation for integral resilience was:
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RIR =
Ti + F∆Tf +R∆Tr
Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr
(1.8)
Ti was the time of the incident or disturbance, ∆Tf was the time from the inci-
dent to the system minimum performance, ∆Tr was the time from system minimum
performance until the system achieved stable recovery. The failure and recovery
profiles, F and R, captured the ratio of performance over time to status quo perfor-
















Ayyub [2015] proposed a practical version of Equation 1.8 making the following
assumptions:
• Step degradation at ti = td
• Linear or step recovery completed at tr
• Disrupting events followed the Poisson distribution.
These assumptions demonstrated the model versatility by including varying
failure and recovery levels. The practical Integral Resilience model was:
RIRprac = 1− exp(−λth(1− pR̄f )) + exp(λth) (1.10)
R̄f was the non-resilience per failure for the step failure and linear recovery cases:
R̄fstep =





(tr − ti)(ϕ(t0)− ϕ(tr))
2ϕ(tr)th
(1.12)
The time, th, was the planning horizon for the system stakeholders; λ was the rate
of the Poisson process; and p was the probability of failure given a disturbance. The
study assigned th the value of the return period for the disturbance, frac1λ.
Ouyang et al. [Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio, 2012, Ouyang and Wang, 2015,
Ouyang et al., 2012] presented resilience as the ratio of the integrals of the perfor-









Ouyang explicitly stated that the target performance profile Q(t) may vary
with time. This model, along with the models in Equations 1.8 and 1.10, captured
the ratio of areas under performance curves (Figure 1.4). The numerator was the
area under the performance curve of the system when a failure occurs. The denom-
inator was the area under the performance curve with no failure.
Gama Dessavre et al. [2016] proposed applying the integral resilience concept







where th was the time horizon, and RQR was the Quotient Resilience (Equation 1.1).
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1.5.3 Hybrid Resilience Models
Vugrin et al. [2010] proposed a family of resilience models. The foundational
model, systemic impact, was the area between the targeted system performance, Q,





System impact shared similarities with the resilience triangle. A system with no
disturbance recorded a system impact of zero. The final form of resilience was
Recovery-Dependent Resilience(RDR):
RDR =





When α = 0, RDR is similar to the recovery and failure profiles in Equation 1.9
except desired RDR approaches zero rather than one:








One model used aspects of both point-in-time resilience and time interval
resilience. The model, proposed by Tran [2015], Tran et al. [2017] included aspects




σr[δ + ζ + 1− τ r−δ] if r − δ ≥ 0
















= ρ(Sp = 1) (1.20)
The total performance factor, σ, was a time-interval resilience model. The
product of absorption factor, δ, and recovery factor, r, were equivalent to the re-
silience factor in Equation 1.2. The recovery time factor τ , rewarded a system for
a quick recovery. The volatility factor, ζ, lowered the resilience value when perfor-
mance has high volatility.
1.5.4 Network Resilience Models
Chen and Miller-Hooks [2012] defined resilience as, “. . . a network’s capability
to resist and recover from disruption or disaster.” The resulting network resilience
model produced a ratio (α) between the maximum demand satisfied after a distur-
bance (dw for origin-destination pair w ∈ W) and the maximum demand satisfied









This model explicitly called out satisfied demand as a desired end for a system’s
function [Chen et al., 2012]. The study that exercised the model used deterministic
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failures and a constant level of demand, but the model could accommodate changing
stakeholder demands.
Alderson et al. [2015] defined operational resilience as, “the ability of a sys-
tem to adapt its behavior to maintain continuity of function (or operations) in the
presence of disruptions.” The model used Defender-Attacker-Defender models used
commonly in the Operations Research field. A Defender-Attacker-Defender model
defined the order and number of actions (moves) taken by notional defenders and
attackers
1. A defender chose the assets to defend
2. An attacker selected and destroyed assets
3. The defender re-allocated resources to compensate for the destroyed assets.
The output of the model Was maximum flow after the defender’s final move.
Of particular interest was the worst-case maximum flow of the system for a given
the number of attacks available to the attacker [Alderson et al., 2011, 2014, 2015].
1.5.5 Resilience Model Comparisons
Each resilience model in the literature attached a case studies for demonstrat-
ing the models impact, but only two studies compared different resilience models
using the same case study. Gama Dessavre et al. [2016] compared an integral re-
silience model to the quotient resilience model. The authors concluded that quotient
resilience was the superior model because it showed higher sensitivity during the fail-
ure event than integral resilience. Tran compared integral resilience to the hybrid
23
resilience model while varying recovery time, recovery profile, and volatility. Tran
concluded that the hybrid model is more sensitive to these parameters [Tran, 2015,
Tran et al., 2017].
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Chapter 2: Gaps, Needs, and Research Objectives
This chapter identifies gaps in the state-of-the-art as reported in Chapter 1.
The research objectives for the dissertation derive from these gaps. The gaps, needs,
and research objectives inform the methodology and case study selection in following
chapters.
2.1 Gap 1 - Stakeholder Preferences
The resilience models reviewed in the preceding chapter satisfy the question:
“Resilience of what to what?” [Carpenter et al., 2001]. The models require a system
(of what) and a threat or disturbance (to what). Answering these two questions
was adequate for ecological systems where continued existence and flourishing of
a species or habitat is the goal, but a key piece of context, purpose, was missing
when applied to engineered systems. Common definitions of engineered systems
emphasize the system’s purpose [INCOSE, 2017, Law, 2015]. One way to frame
purpose, is identify the stakeholders and their desires by adding the question “for
whom?” Table 1.1 shows examples of this context by mapping systems to outputs
to stakeholders.
Stakeholders define the purpose of the system [Aven, 2003, Ayyub, 2014a,
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Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Freeman, 1984, Mitroff, 1983]. The role of the stake-
holder is implicit in many the resilience models; often status quo performance is
the baseline for desired performance. In some situations, a stakeholder may desire
more (or less) output from during a disturbance and after recovery. The stakeholder
may have period time, past which, the system’s performance becomes unimportant
compared to other pressing needs.
Economics defines many of the concepts necessary to include stakeholder pref-
erences in resilience models. The first assumption is to treat the stakeholder as a
rational consumer of the functional output of the system of interest. As a rational
consumer, the stakeholder makes decisions regarding improvements to the system
of interest using preferences. These preferences are the basis to compare system
performance after a disturbance. This study explores the impact of changing three
preferences: the stakeholder’s preferred time horizon, endogenous preference, and
intertemporal substitutability. The following sections describe the three preferences
in more detail.
2.1.1 Time Horizon
Time horizon is the “The most remote future period taken into account in
making economic decisions, such as investment” [Black et al., 2017]. Stakeholders
define preferred time horizons. The stakeholders’ time horizons impact preferred
options. The stakeholder may have a time horizon independent of recovery time.









Figure 2.1: Moving time horizon
or the stakeholder’s anticipated period of responsibility for the system. The stake-
holders’ time horizons dictate preferred options leading different preferred courses
of actions for different stakeholders. A short time horizon may stress reliability or
avoidance of failure because time for recovery may be greater than the time horizon
[Demsetz, 1996]. Figure 2.1 shows two different time horizons.
2.1.2 Endogenous Preferences
Endogenous preferences are “Individual preferences that form under the influ-
ence of the economic, social, legal, and cultural structure of the environment and
may change in response to changes in the environment” [Black et al., 2017]. Status
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quo performance is acceptable in normal operating conditions, but resilience anal-
ysis requires examining preferences during times of disturbance. A stakeholder’s
appetite for a system’s output will change during times of crisis. Highway usage
during a hurricane illustrates the point. Prior to landfall, outbound traffic may
demand more than one hundred percent of outbound capacity. Inbound traffic flow
may be reversed to accommodate the demand. During the hurricane, demand for
the freeways falls to well below limits as only emergency services use the road. After
the hurricane, the highways handle greater freight capacity to deal with inflowing
supplies. In the context of system performance, endogenous preference is the level
of functional performance desired by the stakeholder at a given time. This coin-
cides with the targeted performance profile, Q(t), used in several resilience models
[Ayyub, 2014a, 2015, Kong et al., 2015, Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio, 2012, Ouyang
et al., 2012].
One situation overlooked by the literature is the case with a demand change
but no system degradation. This is depicted in Figure 2.2 where the dashed line
represents the demanded output from the system. The models described above
cannot address this situation as the performance level, ϕ(t), has no critical points in
time. The critical time points and values are all part of the endogenous preference,












Figure 2.2: Constant performance and changing endogenous preference scenario
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2.1.3 Intertemporal Substitutability
Intertemporal substitutability is the “replacement of the consumption of a
good or service at one point in time by consumption at a different time” [Black
et al., 2017]. In the context of the resilience timeline, intertemporal substitutability
quantifies the value of excess performance from the resistance and recovery phases
during the robustness phase. If the stakeholder can use surplus production, a re-
silience model should be able to differentiate between systems. The model of this
study will assume that some fraction of excess production can be used at any time
during the failure period. Other models may fade out the substitutability as the
time of excess production moves further from the failure period. The intertemporal
substitutability factor, χ(t), adjusts the value of the excess production. If surplus is
ephemeral (χ = 0), then excess production during that period has no value outside
of that time. An example of this is excess electricity production without backup
capacity. If surplus is permanent (χ = 1), all excess output may be applied to
shortfalls. An example of this situation is excess electricity with a storage system
that has no loss. A value between zero and one identifies some loss in value when
exchanging its time output. Intertemporal substitutability may also be time- and
event-dependent.
2.2 Gap 2 - Model Comparison
The literature has few studies studies comparing the outputs of competing re-
silience models. In general, the resilience model literature focuses upon development
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and application of a resilience model with little direct comparison among models.
Few instances of resilience model comparison in support of decision-making. The
reader is left with little in the way of guidance for choosing an appropriate resilience
model or the limitations of a resilience model.
2.3 Gap 3 - Common Framework for Resilience Assessment
The resilience literature focuses upon resilience model development or identi-
fying system-specific characteristics of a system that improve resilience. A gap in
the state of the art is a methodology for conducting a resilience analysis that allows
an analyst to apply the same methodology to cross-domain systems. This capability
is critical when considering a complex, interconnected system of systems such as the
infrastructure and operation of a city after a natural disaster.
2.4 Research Objective 1 - Develop Hybrid Resilience Framework
Research objective 1 defines a methodology for conducting a resilience analy-
sis. The methodology should accommodate multiple system functional outputs and
stakeholder preferences. The methodology applies to a wide variety of systems and
data generation methods by separating the system model from the resilience model.
One task extends a set of resilience models to include three key stakeholder
preferences: time horizon, endogenous preference, and intertemporal substitutabil-
ity. The result is a mathematical framework for quantifying resilience as a decision
support model incorporating the preferences of primary stakeholders. The exten-
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sion will explicitly incorporate the stakeholder needs identified in Gap 1: endogenous
preference, time horizon, and intertemporal substitutability.
2.5 Research Objective 2 - Conceptual Validation of the Resilience
Models in the Context of the Hybrid Resilience Framework
Conceptual validation builds trust in the outputs of resilience models. A key
task is developing fundamental profiles of functional performance and stakeholder
preference. The fundamental models are the inputs to the resilience models that
cause a change in resilience that can be determined by inspection. For instance,
by varying robustness of a system after failure and holding the other parameters
constant, as robustness increases, resilience should increase. This will be done for
all phases of resilience and for the stakeholder preferences. Comparisons of the
resilience models’ behaviors form the basis for assessing each model’s ability to
support decision and communicate uncertainty.
2.6 Research Objective 3 - Apply Hybrid Resilience Framework to
Case Studies
Case studies identify systems of interest and their associated simulations pro-
vide the inputs to exercise the decision-support capability of the resilience model.
The case studies will demonstrate the effects of changes in stakeholder preferences
and selected courses of action. The case studies’ systems of interest for suffer dis-
turbances of uncertain strength at uncertain intervals. The level of degradation
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after a failure may vary. The speed and level of recovery may vary. The hybrid
resilience methodology case studies will be in unrelated domains and demonstrate
compatibility with system of system analysis.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The overarching methodology comprised four steps. The first step selected the
resilience models and identified the input metrics and parameters for the models.
The second step extended, or modified, the models to include stakeholder prefer-
ences. Completion of step one and two satisfied research objective 1. The third step
conceptually validated the resilience models using fundamental models of system
performance and stakeholder need. Step three satisfied research objective two. The
fourth step applied the resilience models to simulation case studies. Two different
types of simulations provided input to the resilience models. Step four satisfied the
third research objective. Figure 3.3 shows the high-level methodological flow.
3.1 Defining the Hybrid Modeling Framework
Resilience requires context. Carpenter et al. [2001] summarized the context
of resilience in socio-ecological problems with the question “... resilience of what
to what?” Studies in engineering proposed adding “for whom?” when discussing
engineered systems [Emanuel, 2017, Emanuel and Ayyub, in press]. Ayyub [2014b]
defined the method for measuring resilience: “The resilience of a system’s function
can be measured based on the persistence of a corresponding functional perfor-
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mance under uncertainty in the face of disturbances.” One or multiple stakeholders’
preferences provide the context for assessing the value of the system’s functional
output. The stakeholder preferences answer the questions “How much is enough?”,
“How long must the system perform?”, and “What value will today’s surplus output
have when the system suffers a disturbance in functional output?” [Emanuel, 2017,
Emanuel and Ayyub, in press]
Shanthikumar and Sargent [1983] described four types of hybrid models com-
posed of analytical models and simulations. In a class I hybrid model, an analytical
model and a simulation worked independently to provide analyst’s solution. A class
II model used an analytic model to scope the sampling space for the simulation.
A class III model used simulation results as an input to an analytical model (Fig-
ure 3.1. The roles reversed in a class IV model with the analytic model providing










Used for Problem 
Solving
Figure 3.1: Class III hybrid simultion/analytic model [Shanthikumar and Sargent, 1983]
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Simulation and analytical models each have their own advantages for resilience
analysis. The composition of system, systems of systems, and their associated data
vary greatly across domains, but the attributes of resilience apply across domains.
The class III hybrid model provided the flexibility to produce appropriate data for
the system, system of systems, threats, and scenarios, while maintaining a com-
mon analytical model for calculating resilience. The class III hybrid model served
as the framework for identifying system characteristics, data of interest, and the
stakeholder preferences.
The class III hybrid model explicitly separates the system data and the re-
silience analytical model as shown in Figure 3.1. The system splits into the system
and the stakeholder shown in Figure 3.2. The system informed the data generation
method. Data generation methods included data collected from the system in oper-
ation; data collected from similar systems or systems under test; or a simulation of
the system. Endogenous preference, time horizon, and intertemporal substitutabil-
ity populated the stakeholder model. Some data generation methods could include
portions of the stakeholder profile; for instance, a simulation could model the stor-





























Figure 3.3: General methodology
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The hybrid resilience framework guides the analyst through the analysis:
1. Identify the system of interest
2. Identify system representation, for example:
• System in its operating environment
• System in a test environment
• Surrogate system
• System simulation
3. Collect functional output data, such as:
• Direct measurement from operating system
• Direct measurement from test system
• Outputs from system simulation




5. Produce resilience measurements
3.1.1 System Identification and Functional Output Measurement
The analyst first identifies the system(s) of interest and the functional out-
put(s). This activity sets the scope of the study which drives the physical and
functional definition of the system(s) of interest. Stakeholders have requirements
for output from the system of interest. Selecting the system and functional models
should always be performed in this context. The analyst defines the external layers
interfacing with the system of interest. The external layers provide context for the
normal operating environment of the system and disturbance type, frequency, and
magnitude to the system [Egli et al., 2015].
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The functional outputs of the system of interest provide the measures for
the resilience analytic model [Ayyub, 2014a]. The symbol ϕ represents functional
performance. The functional performance is a key input for the resilience analytical
model.
3.1.2 Stakeholder Preference Profiles
The stakeholder preference profiles provides the context for the functional
output data. A stakeholder must determine the quantity of output that satisfies
stakeholder needs, the overall time period the system must operate to be useful to
the stakeholder, and the ability to time-shift surplus functional output to periods
of shortage.
3.2 Select Resilience Model Candidates
The literature identified several potential models to use to measure resilience
incorporating stakeholder preferences. Figure 3.4 shows the criteria for selecting
resilience models for this study. The first requirement is the resilience models must
satisfy the definition of resilience. That is, the resilience model must encompass the
resistance, robustness, and recovery phases, or be amenable to extension.
The resilience model must support a class III hybrid simulation/analytic frame-
work. The resilience model must be separable from the system, and it must use the
functional output of the system as an input. These two requirements ensure the
resilience model will be portable among different systems and data types.
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Select Resilience Model Candidates
Compatible with Class III Hybrid Simulation/analytic model
Encompasses all phases of resilience:
  1) Resistance
  2) Robustness
  3) Recovery
Amenable to include stakeholder preferences:
  1) Time horizon
  2) Endogenous breference
  3) Intertemporal substitutability
Differ substantively from all other selected models
Figure 3.4: Resilience model selection criteria
The resilience analytic model must account for the stakeholder preferences
defined in Section 2.1 or be modifiable to incorporate the preferences as parameters
in the model.
Table 3.1 summarizes the desired characteristics of a resilience model. Some
models, such as network models and resilience triangle-type models, focus upon the
robustness, or robustness and recovery of the system. Network models couple tightly
with the simulation and models of the network itself. This makes network models
difficult to extract for use on non-network type systems. The time-based resilience
models cover all phases of resilience, are separable from the model of the system,
and are based upon the output of the system.
42
The study selected Integral Resilience, Resilience Factor, Quotient Resilience,
and Total Quotient Resilience (Table 3.2). Each of these models satisfied the re-
quirements listed above.
















































































Resilience Triangle (Eq. 1.5) X X X X
Adjusted Resilience Triangle (Eq. 1.7) X X X X
Quotient Resilience (Eq. 1.1) X X X X X X
Network Resilience (Eq. 1.21 X X
Current Potential Resilience (Eq. 1.13) X X X X X X
Resilience Curve [Alderson et al., 2011] X X
Integral Resilience (Eq. 1.8) X X X X X X
Practical Integral Resilience (Eq. 1.10) X X X X X
Expected System Degradation Factor (Eq. 1.4) X X X X X
Resilience Factor (Eq. 1.2) X X X X X X
Recovery Dependent Resilience (Eq. 1.16) X X X X X X
Total Resilience (Eq. 1.14) X X X X X X
3.3 Extend the Models to Include Stakeholder Preferences
After selecting the candidate models, the next step is identifying where the
models include stakeholder preferences and extending the metrics to include the
preferences they are missing. Figure 3.5 shows the three stakeholder preferences
and the symbology used throughout the study.
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Table 3.2: Resilience models used in this study.
Model Name Analytical Model
Quotient Resilience (Eq. 1.1) RQR =
ϕ(t)− ϕ(td)
ϕ(t0)− ϕ(td)










Integral Resilience (Eq. 1.8) RIR =
Ti + F∆Tf +R∆Tr
Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr
3.3.1 Incorporate Time Horizon
The integral resilience models implicitly assume the time horizon ends with
recovery [Ayyub, 2014a, Francis and Bekera, 2014, Gama Dessavre et al., 2016,
Henry and Ramirez-Marquez, 2012] or explicitly with the return period of the stres-
sor [Ayyub, 2015]. While these are two reasonable points for a time horizon, the
stakeholder may have other motivations for setting a time horizon such as the rea-
sonable lifetime of the system, an anticipated operational capability of a replacement
system, or the return period of a random process.
The resilience model currently ends at the recovery time. The stakeholder
defined time horizon is th. Time horizon is naturally included in the Resilience
Factor and Quotient Resilience models. One simply records the resilience value at
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Intertemporal Substitutability,  ?(t)
Figure 3.5: Extend resilience models to incorporate stakeholder preferences
the time of interest, tr, for Resilience Factor and t for Quotient Resilience.










Integral resilience supports this method for times less than the recovery time,
but an additional factor is necessary to accommodate time horizons that extend
beyond the recovery time. ∆Th = th − tr is the time period from recovery to the
stakeholder’s time horizon. Adding ∆Th changes the resilience model to:
RIR =
Ti + F∆Tf +R∆Tr + ∆Th
Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr + ∆Th
(3.3)
3.3.2 Stakeholder Endogenous Preference
The change to resilience factor is straightforward. The initial performance
level, ϕ(t0), is replaced by the stakeholder need at the appropriate time in the
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denominator. Rather than take the values at the minimum performance level, td,








Quotient Resilience incorporates stakeholder need by substituting ϕ(t) with a ratio
of figure of merit and need ϕ(t)
Q(t)











A pre-disturbance profile, M , and a post-recovery profile, H, capture the excess
















Applying the coefficients to the appropriate time interval results in the following
Integral Resilience model:
RIR =
M∆Ti + F∆Tf +R∆Tr +H∆Th
∆Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr + ∆Th
(3.7)
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3.3.3 Incorporate Intertemporal Substitutability
Intertemporal substitutability,χ, is the “replacement of the consumption of
a good or service at one point in time by consumption at a different time” [Black
et al., 2017]. Intertemporal substitutability takes values from zero to one. The value
of χ may be constant for the entire time horizon, or it may be dependent upon time
or events. Two special values of χ are the ephemeral and permanent cases. The
ephemeral case (χ = 0) allows no substitution across time. When the system has a
shortage at time tj, surplus from time ti has no value. The permanent case (χ = 1)
where a surplus retains its full value or utility throughout the time horizon. Any
surplus at time ti has full value at time tj.
The following expression incorporates intertemporal substitutability into the









for ϕ(t) ≥ Q(t)
(3.8)
Resilience Factor becomes:
ρE = SpΦχ(td)Φχ(th) (3.9)







Extending total quotient resilience merely changes the integrand in the numerator










Integral Resilience must incorporate time substitutability into each of the profiles,
M , F , R, and H. The time substitutability factor applies the same way for each
profile. For all t where ϕ is less than Qr(t), the profile value remains unchanged:
Mχ(t0 ≤ t ≤ ti) =

M ϕ(t) < Q(t)
1 + χ(t)(M − 1) ϕ ≥ Q(t)
Fχ(t0 ≤ t ≤ ti) =

F ϕ(t) < Q(t)
1 + χ(t)(F − 1) ϕ ≥ Q(t)
Rχ(t0 ≤ t ≤ ti) =

R ϕ(t) < Q(t)
1 + χ(t)(R− 1) ϕ ≥ Q(t)
Hχ(t0 ≤ t ≤ ti) =

H ϕ(t) < Q(t)
1 + χ(t)(H − 1) ϕ ≥ Q(t)
(3.12)
The Extended Integral Resilience becomes:
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REIR =
Mχ∆Ti + Fχ∆Tf +Rχ∆Tr +Hχ∆Th
∆Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr + ∆Th
(3.13)
Table 3.3 summarizes the naming conventions and equations for all resilience
analytical models, original and extended, that are part of this study.
Fundamental deterministic and stochastic simulations provided the scenarios
for considering the merits of each resilience metric. Scenarios were a set of inputs to
develop the data for performance of a notional system and for notional stakeholders
that are inputs for the resilience models. The scenarios were fundamental in the
sense that, through the understanding of the definition of resilience, the direction
of the change in the resilience value can be determined by inspection. For example,
if the robustness of a system increased, one should expect the resilience to increase
as well. Figure 3.6 shows the process for conceptually validating the models.
A series of foundational models of system performance and stakeholder need
provided the scenarios for measurement. The assessment covered the models’ ability
to distinguish between different performance models and their consistency. The
baseline deterministic performance and preference profiles are:
• Step failure without recovery (Figure 4.1a)
• Step failure with step recovery (Figure 4.1b)
• Step failure with linear recovery (Figure 4.1c)












Figure 3.6: Steps to conceptually validate the original and extended
resilience models
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Table 3.3: Summary of the Eight Resilience Analytical Models
Model Name Analytical Model
Quotient Resilience RQR =
ϕ(t)− ϕ(td)
ϕ(t0)− ϕ(td)
Extended Quotient Resilience REQR(t) =
Φχ(t)− Φχ(td)
Φχ − Φχ(td)

















Extended Resilience Factor ρE = SpΦχ(td)Φχ(th)
Integral Resilience RIR =
Ti + F∆Tf +R∆Tr
Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr
Extended Integral Resilience REIR =
Mχ∆Ti + Fχ∆Tf +Rχ∆Tr +Hχ∆Th
∆Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr + ∆Th
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Table 3.4: Scenarios for Deterministic Fundamental Profiles
Scenario Constant Parameters Varied Parameters
Step Failure without Recovery Initial Performance




















No Failure with Changing Need
Initial Performance





Two case studies will satisfy Research Objective 3: “Exercise the decision-
support capability of the resilience in two case studies using different types of models
to simulate the behavior of the systems.” The models simulated how inputs were
turned into functional outputs. Each case study defined scenarios, stakeholders, dis-
ruptive events, functional outputs, and basis of analysis. Stakeholder perspectives
defined the functional outputs of interest and their associated preferences. Disrup-
tive events caused degradation in functional output and may be external or internal
to the system. External disruptive events were changes to the input variable or the
stakeholder preferences whereas internal disruptive events are failures to the working
of the system that cause degradation of the functional output.
For all cases, the study developed indicators in the resilience software to enable
analysts to spot-check the operation of the resilience model. Before generating com-
plex time-series data of the system’s functional output, the resilience models used
fundamental models. Ad hoc stakeholder and performance parameter sensitivity
studies built confidence that the model responded appropriately.
3.4.1 Infrastructure Resilience Case Study
To demonstrate the hybrid methodology, a system dynamics model of the
critical infrastructure systems of Austin, Texas provides the functional outputs for
the resilience model (Figure 3.7). The infrastructure case study has three phases.
The first phase investigates a deterministic electrical failure and its impact on water
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supply from the perspective of three stakeholders. The second phase studies an
electrical failure’s impact on seven other critical infrastructures each with their own
stakeholder preference profiles. The third phase applies a probabilistic electrical
failure defined by a Monte Carlo simulation of hurricane arrival times and strength
to stresses the electrical system output in the system dynamics model. The resilience
model captures the resilience of all critical infrastructures identified in the model
relative to their stakeholders’ preferences, and the storm impact to the electrical
system. The study applies the hybrid methodology to produce a post hoc analysis
of the electrical grid resilience of post-Maria Puerto Rico.
3.4.2 Fleet Resilience Case Study
The US Department of Defense has many long-lived systems with multiple
stakeholders with different preferences. The fleet resilience case study applied the
hybrid resilience framework to a squadron of training aircraft (Figure 3.8). Key
stakeholders were the program manager and the squadron commanding officers. The
study calculated the resilience of several functional outputs of the training squadron
(graduation rates, satisfaction rates, daily ready aircraft) with the intent to allow
stakeholders to quantify the impact of three courses of action. Stakeholder pro-
files explored different values for time horizon, endogenous need, and intertemporal
substitutability. Further development of the intertemporal substitutability enabled
time and event based stakeholder preference profiles. A discrete event simulation
developed provided the time-series functional data input for the resilience analytical
54
System Dynamics Model of a City's Infrastructures
Multiple Systems
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Figure 3.8: Fleet resilience case study
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3.5 Methodology Review
This overall study has four sections of action. The first step selected the
resilience models best capable of:
• Using the functional output of the system as an input
• Compatible with a class III hybrid simulation/analytic model to ensure com-
patibility with a broad spectrum of data sources
• Encompasses all phases of resilience
• Incorporates or is amenable to modification to incorporate three stakeholder
preferences
• Differ substantively from the other selected models.
The second step modified the models to include the time horizon, endogenous pref-
erence, and intertemporal substitutability stakeholder preferences. The third step
conceptually validated the models by assessing their resilience measurements using
fundamental models of performance. The fourth and final step exercised the models
in two different case studies, infrastructure resilience and fleet resilience. Figure 3.9














Select Resilience Model 
Candidates
Compatible with 
Class III Hybrid 
Simulation/analytic model
Encompasses all phases of 
resilience:
  1) Resistance
  2) Robustness
  3) Recovery
Amenable to include 
stakeholder preferences:
  1) Time horizon
  2) Endogenous preference
  3) Intertemporal 
substitutability




















System Dynamics Model of a City's Infrastructures








































Figure 3.9: Flow of the methodology from model selection to case studies
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Chapter 4: Resilience Model Comparison
The resilience model comparison study applied fundamental performance and
stakeholder preference profiles to the eight resilience models defined in the previous
chapter. The study progressed, one factor at a time, through the key aspects of the
performance and stakeholder models to identify situations where the models yield
undesirable results, such as insensitivity. The performance scale was set so normal
operations is 1.0 and the time scale is from 0 to 100 and was indifferent to the units
of the functional output.
4.1 Fundamental performance and preference profiles
Deterministic, fundamental profiles of performance and preference enabled a
parametric analysis of the resilience models. The performance profiles were:
1. Step failure without recovery with constant endogenous preference,
2. Step failure with step recovery with constant endogenous preference,
3. Step failure with linear recovery with constant endogenous preference,
4. Step increase in endogenous preference with constant system performance.
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Figure 4.1: Fundamental performance and endogenous preference profiles
The fundamental performance profiles allowed the analyst to assess the re-
silience models’ sensitivity and behavior in response to parameter variation. The
performance profile parameters varied for system performance (e.g., time to failure,
recovery level) and stakeholder preferences. The parameters defining the perfor-
mance of the system were: time to failure (td), robustness (ϕ(td) and F ), time to
recover (tr), and recovery level (ϕ(tr), R, and H). All profiles assumed an instan-
taneous failure, so failure initiation time, failure completion time, and minimum
performance time were the same for all profiles (ti = td = tf ). The stakeholder
preference parameters were time horizon (th), endogenous preference (Q(t)), and
intertemporal substitutability (χ). Table 4.1 lists the parameter values for all fun-
damental profiles.
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Table 4.1: Parameters for Fundamental Profiles











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ϕ(t < ti) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
ϕ(td < t < tr) 0.1 0 - 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
ϕ(tr) 0.9 0.1 - 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.9
td 20 - 60 20 20 20 20 20 20
tr 20 - 60 60 60 60 60
th 80 80 80 80 0 - 100 80 80
Q(t) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8∗ 0 - 1.0 0.8∗
χ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1.0
BLANK entries do not apply to the profile
∗ Except the changing need model
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4.1.1 Time to Failure
Figure 4.2 shows the the resilience value from the models as time to failure
varies from 20-60 using profile 4.1(a). Resilience Factor and Quotient Resilience are
insensitive to the time to failure while Extended and Integral Resilience increase as
the time to failure increases.
4.1.2 Robustness
Robustness is the amount of performance remaining after failure [Ayyub,
2014a, 2015]. The robustness performance profile varied the failure level, ϕ(t > td),
of Figure 4.1(a) from zero (complete failure) to one (no failure). Figure 4.3 shows
the resilience models’ behavior. Extended Total Quotient Resilience stepped from a
resilience of 0.5 to a resilience of 1.0 when ϕ(td) ≥ 0.8. Extended Resilience Factor
and extended Integral Resilience were greater than or equal to their corresponding
original resilience models for the entire profile and level off once the ϕ(td) ≥ Q(t).
Quotient Resilience and Total Quotient Resilience were insensitive to changes
in the failure level. Inspecting Quotient Resilience, which is at the base of all four
models, revealed the reason for this insensitivity. For all constant failure levels,
RQR = 0 because the numerator is the difference between the performance at time t
and the minimum performance. This occurs whether the performance in the failed
state is 90% of desired or completely failed. Because of this, the Quotient Resilience
family of models cannot capture robustness.
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Figure 4.2: Resilience model responses to time to failure in the step
failure without recovery performance profile
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Figure 4.3: Resilience model responses to robustness
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4.1.3 Recovery Time
The recovery time performance profile varied the recovery time in Figure 4.1(b)
from 21 to 60. Figure 4.4 shows Resilience Factor and Quotient Resilience models
were insensitive to the change in recovery time. Both Integral Resilience and Total
Quotient Resilience showed decreasing resilience as the time in the degraded state
increased.
4.1.4 Recovery Level
The recovery level profile varied the recovery level in Figure 4.1(b) from
ϕ(tr) = 0.1 (no recovery) to ϕ(tr) = 1.2. Figure 4.5 shows all resilience mod-
els are sensitive to recovery level. The original resilience models increased linearly
as recovery levels rise. The extended resilience models increase linearly until the
recovery level surpassed stakeholder desired output (ϕ(tr ≥ 0.8).
4.1.5 Time Horizon
The time horizon sensitivity assessment used the four fundamental profiles
depicted in Figure 4.1. The time horizon varies from 0 to 100. Figure 4.6 shows the
resilience model responses as time horizon varies for each failure model.
Figure 4.6(a) shows the responses of the resilience models to the step failure
without recovery profile. Extended and Original Quotient Resilience values fell from
one to zero despite a robustness of 0.1 in the degraded state. Extended and Original
Resilience Factor fell at the time of failure. Integral Resilience showed a slow drop
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Figure 4.4: Resilience model responses to time to recover
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Figure 4.5: Resilience model responses to recovery level
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Figure 4.6: Resilience model response to step failure and recovery with
varying time horizon
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off in value for both models as the time horizon increases.
Figure 4.6(b) showed the responses of the resilience models a to the step failure
with step recovery profile. The extended resilience models were equal to or greater
than their original counterpart. The Resilience Factor and Quotient Resilience mod-
els responded only at the failure (td) and recovery (tr) times. The Integral Resilience
Models and Total Quotient Resilience Models responded to failure and recovery val-
ues over the entire post-disturbance time.
Figure 4.6(c) shows the resilience model responses to the step failure with
linear recovery profile. In each case, the value of the extended resilience model
was equal to or greater than the original model. Resilience Factor and Quotient
Resilience models responded at failure and rose linearly during the recovery period.
Both Integral Resilience Models showed nonlinear response over the profile.
Figure 4.6(d) shows resilience model responses to the profile with no system
failure and a step change in stakeholder endogenous preference. Both Original Quo-
tient Resilience and Original Total Quotient Resilience were undefined for the profile.
Original Integral Resilience and Original Resilience Factor had constant resilience
value of one. The other models models expressed responses similar to the step failure
with step recovery time horizon profile in Figure 4.6(b).
4.1.6 Endogenous Preference
The endogenous preference case varied a constant endogenous need from zero
to one for profiles in Figure 4.1(a), (b), and (c). All original resilience models were
69
insensitive to changing the endogenous preference (Figure 4.7). Quotient Resilience
was sensitive to satisfied endogenous preference, Q(t) ≥ ϕ(td), but largely insensitive
to the degree of satisfaction. Extended Integral Resilience, Extended Resilience
Factor, and Extended Quotient Resilience showed distinction between small changes
in endogenous preference for much of the profile.
Figure 4.7: Step failure and recovery to endogenous preference
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4.1.7 Intertemporal Substitutability
The intertemporal substitutability assessment used all four fundamental pro-
files in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.8 depicts the resilience model results while varying the
intertemporal substitutability (χ) from zero to one for the four profiles. The orig-
inal resilience models were insensitive to changes in intertemporal substitutability.
Extended Integral Resilience and Extended Resilience Factor rose with increasing
χ, while Extended Quotient Resilience and Extended Total did not change.
4.2 Results from Fundamental Performance and Preference Profiles
This study developed performance/preference profiles capable of varying pa-
rameters critical system performance and stakeholder preference. Table 4.2 aggre-
gates the sensitivities of the original and extended resilience models. The study
first found insensitivity of the original models to endogenous preference and time
substitutability. The study also found Extended Integral Resilience to be the only
model sensitive to all profile and preference parameters.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter assessed the sensitivity of eight resilience models to parameters
based on fundamental performance and preference profiles. One resilience model,
Extended Integral Resilience, showed sensitivity to all parameter changes. The other
resilience models showed insensitivity to parameters that are critical to selecting a
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Figure 4.8: Resilience model responses to intertemporal substitutability
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Step Failure
without Recovery
td, ti I I S S I I S S
th S S S S S S S S
Q(t) I S I S I S I S
χ I I I S I I I I
Step Failure
with Step Recovery
ϕ(td) S S S S I I I S
tr I I S S I I I S
ϕ(tr) S S S S S S S S
th S S S S S S S S
Q(t) I S I S I S I S
χ I S I S I S ∗ I S ∗
Step Failure
with Linear Recovery
th S S S S S S S S
Q(t) I S I S I S I S
χ I S I S I S ∗ I S ∗
Variable
Endogenous Preference
Q(t) I S I S I S I S
χ I S I S I I I I
∗ Counter-intuitive behavior
I = Insensitive to parameter; S = Sensitive to parameter; td = Disturbance time;
ti = Disturbance initiation time; th = Time horizon; Q(t) = Endogenous preference;
χ = Intertemporal substitutability factor; ϕ(td) = Performance at disturbance time;
ϕ(tr) = Performance at recovery time
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course of action. The case studies highlighted the Quotient Resilience-based models’
inability to distinguish among courses of action where performance drops to zero for
any amount of time.
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Chapter 5: Infrastructure Resilience Case Study
The case study demonstrated the application of the hybrid resilience frame-
work to a system of systems. The infrastructure resilience case study satisfies the
definition of a system of systems defined earlier [Jamshidi, 2009]. The case study
had three sections. The first two sections focus on assessing the resilience models
within the hybrid framework using the critical infrastructures of a city. The first
section investigated the water infrastructure resilience to electrical power disruption.
The water distribution system had three stakeholders with different preference pro-
files. The second section analyzed the impact of electrical disruption on all critical
infrastructures. Each critical infrastructure had a unique stakeholder preference
profile. The first two sections applied all original and extended metrics defined in
the previous sections (Table 3.3).
The third section focused upon applying the hybrid framework using the ex-
tended Integral Resilience model. The study investigated the failure and recovery
of the electrical system in the context of hurricane damage to a city’s electrical
infrastructure. The section applied the Extended Integral Resilience REIR model
exclusively. First, the study used data collected from Puerto Rico in the aftermath
of Hurricane Maria to calculate resilience. Second, the study investigated the re-
75
silience of the simulated city for the duration and recovery from a single storm. The
Third, the study investigated the city resilience over a ten year time period with
randomly assigned storm arrival times and strengths. Figure 5.2 shows inputs and
outputs of the system dynamics case studies.
5.1 City of Austin Infrastructure System Dynamics Model
In response to requests by stakeholders in Austin, TX, and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Labora-
tory (JHU/APL) designed a system dynamics model simulating the interrelations
among the critical infrastructure systems. Figure 5.1 shows a map of the Travis
County, TX, and Austin, total population 1.2 million. Stakeholders identified their
relationships with other infrastructure systems. The model provided visual feedback
of the consequences of the many relationships to the group. The visual output facili-
tated scenario-based discussions to identify weak points in the overall infrastructure
and potential solutions. The model excluded geographic information in order to
prevent disclosure of sensitive, critical nodes in the infrastructure [Egli et al., 2015].
This study added data extraction methods and the ability to conduct batch runs of
the simulation with stochastic variables.
The simulation included the following critical infrastructures: Energy, Trans-
portation, Water, Health, Emergency Services, Communications, Information Tech-
nology, and Critical Manufacturing. A series of stakeholder interviews and con-
ferences provided the basis for the system dynamics simulation with the intent to
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Figure 5.1: Map of electricity service for Travis County, Texas from
Austin Energy [2013]
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show interdependencies across sectors at a system level relationships rather than
component level. The system dynamics linked the critical infrastructure sectors us-
ing stocks and flows. Stocks are the accumulations of a state variable of the system.
Flows are rates of change in the system. The system dynamics model allows an
analyst to define functionality profiles that vary over time to produce time-series
data to use as inputs to the resilience models.
Within the simulation, each sector produced functional output at a rate deter-
mined by itself and its contributors. This functional output determined the sector
functionality. Based on the production, the sector contributed to other sectors.
A function comprising base production capability, contributing sector inputs, and
assigned degradation from user controls determined the production of the sector.
When a sector’s output degraded, affected sectors saw a loss of functionality through
a reduced contribution from the sector. A priority function defined which depen-
dent sectors receive the input sector’s functionality. In the absence of a priority
function, all sectors experienced a proportional loss of functionality based upon the
degraded contribution. If the affected sectors had reserve capacity of the contribut-
ing sector (e.g., an energy reserve or a water reserve) these reserves compensated
for the degradation until exhausted. Each sector followed this basic construct with
variations based upon input sectors, output sectors, and available reserves.
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Figure 5.2: City infrastructure case studies
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5.2 Water System Stakeholder Perspective
Studies of water deliver performance after major disruptive events identified
multiple stakeholders: firefighters, users that can purify non-potable water, and
users of potable water [Davis et al., 2012, Davis, 2014]. The water system scenario
used the water system’s dependency upon electrical power to show the resilience
impact of implementing different options for modifying the electrical system for
each water system stakeholder. The resilience results enabled an informed discussion
among the stakeholders to select an appropriate course of action.
The system dynamics model simulated a two week period with an electrical
disturbance at the end of the first day. The model captured the impact of electrical
power performance on the water system performance. The electricity stakeholder
had several courses of action available (Table 5.1). The disturbance under consid-
eration was a failure of the electrical system for several days followed by restoration
to 60% of status quo performance. The electricity infrastructure stakeholder consid-
ered four courses of action. Course of action “A” left the system in the status quo
or “as-is” condition. Course of action “B” improved the robustness of the electrical
system. Course of action “C” reduced the time to recover. Course of action “D”
produced a full recovery, as opposed to the 80% recovery in alternatives “B” and
“C”. Figure 5.3 shows the simple step function behavior of the electrical system.
Due to the interconnectivity of the infrastructures, the water system’s functional
output was more complicated for all courses of action.
The water system provided water for firefighting, non-potable water for in-
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Table 5.1: Electrical System Courses of Action





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A Current System 1 Day 0 ˜8 Days 60%
B Improved Robustness 1 Day 25% ˜8 Days 60%
C Improved Time to Recover 1 Day 0 ˜5.5 Days 60%
D Full Recovery 1 Day 0 ˜8 Days 100%









Fire Fighting 30% 0
Non-Potable Water 70% 0.2
Potable Water 90% 0.5
dustrial, public health, and horticultural purposes, and potable water for human
consumption. Firefighters, industrial users (non-potable water supply), and citizens
(potable water supply) each had their own preference values (Table 5.2). The re-
silience models calculated resilience using the functional outputs and the stakeholder
preference profiles defined.
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Figure 5.3: Performance profiles from electrical system courses of action
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Stakeholder∗ C > B > D > A D > A = C > B C > D > A > B B > A = C = D
Fire Fighting B > C > D > A A = B = C = D C > B > A > D B > A = C = D
Non-Potable C > B > D > A D > A = C > B C > D > B > A B > A = C = D
Potable C > B > D > A D > A = C > B C > D > A > B B > A = C = D
Courses of Action:
A - Current System B - Improved Robustness
C - Reduced Time to Recover D - Full Recovery
∗ “No stakeholder” is equivalent to the original versions of each resilience model
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5.2.1 Conclusions from Water Stakeholder Perspective
By inspection of Figure 5.3, courses of action B, C, and D improve upon A, the
status quo, for electricity. Table 5.3 shows the ranked results of the courses of ac-
tion using each resilience model. Quotient Resilience and Total Quotient Resilience
failed to rank the status quo course of action (A) last. The Integral Resilience and
Resilience Factor models ranked Scenario A as the worst alternative for all stake-
holders.
The Resilience Factor column in Figure 5.4 exposed a weakness in the Re-
silience Factor models. The model assigned any system with a moment of complete
failure (ϕ = 0) zero resilience. This held true for momentary failures and for long
failure periods. The ϕ(td) in the numerator of Equations 1.2 and 3.9 made this true
for all cases. The inability to distinguish among courses of action with complete
failure for some period of time is a shortcoming in the information provided by the
Resilience Factor model. This prevented Resilience Factor from providing any in-
formation to the stakeholder as recovery parameters or time to failure parameters
improve.
The Integral Resilience model results showed different ordering of the courses
of action for different stakeholders. The Fire Fighting stakeholder preferred course
of action B (improved robustness) while the other stakeholders preferred course
of action C (faster recovery). With this information, the different stakeholders
could bring trade-offs to negotiations regarding selecting a course of action. This
demonstrated the value of incorporating stakeholder preferences into the resilience
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Figure 5.4: Resilience model responses to water stakeholder case study
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model.
The Extended Integral Resilience model best represented the comparative re-
silience of different courses of action. Quotient Resilience and Total Quotient Re-
silience failed to rank status quo as the worst alternative, and Resilience Factor
lacked resolution among solutions that allow performance to reach zero. This find-
ing was consistent with the results from the fundamental models section (Table 4.2
where the extended Integral Resilience model (Equation 3.13) showed sensitivity to
all varied parameters.
5.3 City Infrastructure Stakeholder Perspective
The City Infrastructure Stakeholder Perspective case study assigned stake-
holder preferences for each critical infrastructure system using the same electrical
infrastructure courses of action (Table 5.1). Table 5.4 shows the preference values
for each infrastructure’s stakeholder. Figure 5.5 shows each of the critical infras-
tructures’ performance over time for each proposed course of action.
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Figure 5.5: All infrastructures performance for a given course of action
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Information Technology 50% 0.5
Healthcare 90% 0.05
Transportation 75% 0.2
Critical Manufacturing 95% 0.2
Emergency Services 80% 0
Water 90% 0.2
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Electricity
D > B > C > A D > A = C > B D > C > A > B B > A = C = D Original
B > D > C > A D > A = C > B D > C > A > B B > A = C = D Extended
Communications
C > A = B = D A = B = C = D C > A = B = D A = B = C = D Original
C > A = B = D A = B = C = D C > A = B = D A = B = C = D Extended
Information
Technology
D > A = B = C D > A = B = C D > A = B = C A = B = C = D Original
D > A = B = C D > A = B = C D > A = B = C A = B = C = D Extended
Healthcare
B > C > D > A D > A > C > B D > C > A > B B > C > A = D Original
B > C > D > A D > A > C > B C = D > B > A B > C > A = D Extended
Transportation
D > C > A = B D > A = B = C D > C > A = B D > A = B = C Original
D > C > A = B D > A = B = C D > C > A = B D > A = B = C Extended
Critical
Manufacturing
D > C > B = A D > A = B = C D > C > B = A A = B = C = D Original
D > C > B = A D > A = B = C D > C > B = A A = B = C = D Extended
Emergency
Services
B > C > D > A D > A = C > B C > D > A > B B > D > A = C Original
B > C > D = A A = B = C = D C > B > D = A B > A = C = D Extended
Water
C > B > D > A D > A = C > B C > D > A > B B > A = C = D Original
B > C > D > A A = B = C = D C > B > A > D B > A = C = D Extended
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5.3.1 Conclusions from City Infrastructure Study
The city infrastructure resilience model results were consistent with the earlier
water system analysis. The Integral Resilience and Resilience Factor models ranked
course of action A, (status quo), as the least preferable option in every case. In-
tegral Resilience model provided more resolution than Resilience Factor as several
of the infrastructure stakeholders (Communications, Information Technology, Crit-
ical Manufacturing) had no preferred course of action using the Resilience Factor
models. In Figure 5.6, the Resilience Factor values were zero for Communications,
Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology across the board. While it may be
true that a complete failure is unacceptable, in those cases, complete failure should
be the decision criterion not resilience. In this situation, the more complex test of
the resilience models yielded more information about their behavior.
5.4 Hurricane Threat Case Study
The previous study applied the resilience models to a single disturbance with
properties assigned by the analyst. The following hurricane threat study applied
data collected from a devastated area, random threat arrival times, random threat
strengths, and a distribution of responses to the threat. The study also investigated
the impact of stakeholder preferences changing over time.
The major hurricanes striking the Caribbean in 2017 underscored the need for
long-term planning for infrastructure maintenance and resilience to major storms
[Hernández et al., 2017, Lu and Alcantara, 2018]. Hurricane Maria passed directly
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Figure 5.6: Resilience model response to different courses of action
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Figure 5.7: Hurricane Maria’s track across the Caribbean Sea [Weather
Forecast Office, 2017]
over Puerto Rico (Figure 5.7) causing an incredible amount of damage to the island’s
infrastructure. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show examples of the extensive damage inflicted
during the storm across Puerto Rico [Weather Forecast Office, 2017]. The resilience
literature provide decision makers a context for making these long-term decisions,
allowing stakeholders of different systems to appreciate the impact of decisions on
long-term resilience of their system.
5.4.1 Hybrid Resilience Framework Application
Figure 5.10 depicts the structure of the analysis using the hybrid model. The
two system-threat pairings of interest are the Puerto Rican electrical grid in the af-
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Figure 5.8: Powerline damage in Mayaguez, PR [Weather Forecast Office, 2017]
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Figure 5.9: Road and powerline damage in Canovanas, PR [Weather
Forecast Office, 2017]
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termath of Hurricane Maria (post hoc resilience observation) and the City of Austin
infrastructure response power outages due to hurricane damage (projected resilience
assessment). Aggregated data from the Department of Energy (DOE) reports pro-
duced the functional outputs for use in the extended Integral Resilience model. The
stakeholder for the Puerto Rico case study desires a return to status quo, and the
time horizon is the observed recovery time. The city infrastructure stakeholders
each have their own long-term and storm-dependent endogenous preferences. The
projected resilience assessment used the city of Austin system dynamics model us-
ing the threat model described below to generate the functional outputs for the
extended Integral Resilience model. The stakeholders had endogenous preference
varying with time and multiple time horizons.
In 2017 Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico [Schmidt et al., 2017] and its
electrical infrastructure [Redacted, 2017]. Less than half of the 3.4 million Puerto
Ricans had access to electrical power two months after the hurricane. Sections of
Puerto Rico’s power grid had not yet recovered six months after the storms [U.S.
Department of Energy, 2018]. Figure 5.11 depicts the island’s key power plants,
transmission lines, and centers of population. When major outages occur on the
mainland U.S., personnel and supplies arrive via relatively fast, using high-volume
transportation such as railroads or highways. Puerto Rico’s resupply comes via fast,
low-volume airlifts or slow, high-volume cargo shipping. This isolation hindered
progress to restore electrical capacity [Lu and Alcantara, 2018].
The Department of Energy (DOE) published reports on the service level of
the electrical grid of Puerto Rico from September 20, 2017 until April 4, 2018.
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System Dynamics Model of a City's Infrastructures
Multiple Systems



















Figure 5.10: Data flow through hybrid model
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Percentage of Customers with Electricity
Percentage of Peak Load Restored
System Dynamics Model Results
Figure 5.12: Peak load and customer services recovery after Hurrican Maria
From the beginning of reporting until October 11, 2017, the DOE provided the
percentage of Puerto Rican customers with electricity. From October 12, 2017
through December 27, 2017, percentage of peak load restored served as a proxy
for percentage of customers served. From January 3 to April 4, 2018, the DOE
reported peak load and customers served. Figure 5.12 shows the trajectories of
customers serviced and peak load for the duration of the reporting period [U.S.
Department of Energy, 2018].
The peak load power sufficed for the demonstration of the hybrid model. The
electrical grid stakeholders would have preferences for peak power and percent of
customers served. Each customer, as stakeholders themselves, would prefer to mea-
sure percentage of their particular electrical needs met per day. The DOE data did
not allow that level of differentiation, so the study proceeded the available data to
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demonstrate the hybrid resilience framework’s flexibility to ingest live data. The
stakeholders preferences were status quo restoration of the project for endogenous
preference and the time period from landfall to recovery as the time horizon. In-
tertemporal substitutability was zero.
The resilience of the electrical grid in response to Hurricane Maria was 0.61.
The resilience analytic model ingested the peak load percentage values to calculate
resilience. The Single Storm Experiment (Section 5.4.4) was a simulation analog to
the real-world data collected from Puerto Rico. The Hurricane Maria result appears
as larger circle in Figures 5.14 and 5.15.
5.4.2 Projected Resilience Analysis
5.4.2.1 Stochastic Threat Model
The threat model required a frequency of storm occurrence, a distribution of
storm strengths, and impact on the electrical system functional output given the
strength of a storm. Broward County, FL, a high-susceptibility region with a 25%
probability of a Category 1 Hurricane or higher in a given year [Jagger et al., 2001],
served as the basis for developing the storm frequency and strength model. The
model used an exponential distribution for the arrival times of storms.
The Saffir-Simpson scale rates hurricanes based upon their sustained wind
speeds and provides a high-level assessment of the damage for each category of
hurricane (Table 5.6) [Schott et al., 2012]. The simulation assumed instantaneous
damage to the electrical system so ti = tf . The simulation drew from triangular
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Table 5.6: Hurricane Properties and Effects on Electrical Infrastructure
Category Wind Strength Probability of Category
1 74 to 95 54%
2 96 to 110 26%
3 111 to 129 14%
4, 5 130+ 6%
Table 5.7: Parameters for Electrical System Behavior
Hurricane Category 1 2 3 4 & 5
Failure Level (%)
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Mode 70 50 0 0
Maximum 90 70 40 0
Recovery Level (%)
Minimum 100 90 80 70
Mode 100 100 95 90
Maximum 100 100 100 100
Recovery Time (days)
Minimum 3 7 14 28
Mode 4.5 17 28 75
Maximum 5 21 35 100
distributions to define the performance parameters of the electrical infrastructure
including failure time (tf ), failure level(ϕ(tf )), recovery time (tr), and recovery level
(ϕ(tr)). recover. The damage descriptions for a given hurricane strength from the
National Hurricane Center were the basis for minimum, maximum, and mode values
of the triangular distribution parameters in Table 5.7 [Schott et al., 2012].
The electrical system functional output over time after the initial damage from
a hurricane was:
ϕ(t) = −ϕ(tr)− (ϕ(tr)− ϕ(tf ))−bt (5.1)
which supported derivation of the restoration parameter, b by setting
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ϕ(t) = 0.99ϕ(tr):








derived from work by Reed et al. [2009].
The parameters defined above describe the behavior of the electrical infras-
tructure system. The system dynamics simulation of the city infrastructure used this
as an input to simulate the functional performance of the other seven infrastructure
systems.
5.4.3 Time-Dependent Stakeholder Models
The stakeholder models included endogenous preference Q(t), time horizon th,
and intertemporal substitutability χ(t). The endogenous preference had two com-
ponents. The first component was a trend over the time, independent of storm
arrivals. The second component was a demand spikes in response to an impend-
ing or occurring storm. The general trend over time established a starting value
representing the current usage of the infrastructure. The endogenous preference for
ten years was a percentage of use given current capacity. The study assumed linear
growth in usage from t0 to th. The growth could project to be greater than 100%
of the current capacity. Table 5.8 shows the values used for “current” and “ten
year” endogenous preference. The profiles demonstrated a mix of excess capacity
and unmet demand for the time period.
Table 5.8 shows the endogenous preferences at the start of the simulation and
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Table 5.8: Endogenous Preference Profiles (% of current capacity)
Infrastructure Start 10 Years
Electricity 100 100
Communications 100 120
Information Technology 95 95
Healthcare 90 120
Transportation 105 120
Emergency Services 90 110
Critical Manufacturing 100 130
Water 100 110
after ten years. Each infrastructure also had its own surplus (or deficit) functional
output. For instance, healthcare had an excess capacity of 10% while transporta-
tion is already at a shortfall of 5% representing traffic gridlock. The stakeholders
generally assumed demand growth over the simulation period.
The perturbing event could change the demand on certain infrastructures. The
stakeholder model reflected this through dynamic endogenous preference spikes in
the event of a storm. The transportation sector’s demand, for example, increased
before a Category 4 storm as residents evacuated the area. The demand remained
high for a period after the storm as first responders and emergency supplies rushed
to the area. The emergency services and healthcare systems experienced a spike in
demand after the storm and returned to normal. Table 5.9 shows the value used for
each of the systems given a strength of the storm. The spike magnitude changed
along with the of the projected figure of merit of the system. That is, if the spike
was 120% and it occurred at year 5 when the endogenous need was 110%, the value
of the spike was 132%.
The system dynamics model simulated the electrical power reserves available
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Table 5.9: Endogenous Preference Spikes Due to Storm
Infrastructure Storm Strength Start(Days) End (Days) Percentage
Healthcare
Cat 1 0 4.5 120
Cat 2 0 17 120
Cat 3 0 28 120
Cat 4,5 0 75 120
Transportation
Cat 1 -2 4.5 120
Cat 2 -5 17 180
Cat 3 -5 28 180
Cat 4,5 -5 75 200
Emergency Services
Cat 1 0 5 120
Cat 2 0 17 120
Cat 3 0 28 120
Cat 4,5 0 75 120
for each infrastructure. In this case, the model of the system, rather than the stake-
holder model, captured an aspect of intertemporal substitutability. When applying
the hybrid resilience framework, analysts must be sensitive to this possibility to
avoid double-counting preferences. For the remainder of this study, χ(t) = 0 to
prevent double counting electrical storage.
5.4.4 Single Storm Experiment
The first experiment investigated the resilience of the city infrastructures for
the duration of a single storm. The system dynamics model simulated 1000 different
storms drawn from the distributions described above. Resilience results for each
critical infrastructure satisfied stopping criterion of less than 1% standard error on
the mean [Sandborn, 2013].
Every storm struck on day six of the simulation. The time horizon was eight
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days after the recovery time. Figure 5.13 shows the time-series data of a single
simulation run with a category 4 hurricane. The solid line is the the performance
of the infrastructure system, and the dotted line is the stakeholder endogenous
preference (Q(t)). This experiment was similar to the post hoc resilience analysis of
Hurricane Maria.
Figure 5.14 shows a boxplot of the resilience for each infrastructure. Fig-
ure 5.15 breaks out the boxplots for each infrastructure by the strength of the
storm. For all boxplots in this study, the lower and upper edges of the box were the
first and third quartiles. The solid bar in the box was the median resilience value.
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Figure 5.13: Time-series example for a category 4 storm
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5.4.5 Multiple Time Horizons Experiment
The experiment comprised 300 simulation runs. Each run had ten random
samples drawn from an exponential distribution with a 25% probability of a storm
within a 12 month period. The sequential sums of the draws assigned the hurricane
landfall times. The experiment discarded all landfall times greater than ten years.
Resilience results for each critical infrastructure satisfied stopping criterion of less
than 1% standard error on the mean [Sandborn, 2013].
The system dynamics model assigned hurricane strength, failure level, recovery
level, and recovery time in accordance with the distributions described in the section
above (Table 5.7). The time horizons were six months, one, two, five, and ten years.
Table 5.10 shows the maximum number of storms per run, average number of storms
per fun, average storm strength, and number of runs with no storms. Degradation
accumulated in the electrical system by multiplying follow-on storm degradations
by the state of the system. For instance, if a previous hurricane had resulted in
a recovery level of 0.80, a subsequent hurricane with recovery level would lead to
a recovery level of 0.64. This allowed investigation of the trade-offs between short
term strength against storm damage and the rising endogenous preferences that are
storm-independent.
The simulation recorded a performance value for all eight infrastructure sys-
tems every four hours. Figure 5.16 shows time-series data for a single run for the
entire ten year time horizon. Vertical gray bars denote the time horizons at 6






























































Figure 5.15: Infrastructure resilience values by hurricane category
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Table 5.10: Storm Data for Each Time Horizon
Time Horizon
Maximum Number







6 months 2 0.14 0.24 259
1 year 3 0.30 0.44 224
2 years 4 0.62 0.92 157
5 years 5 1.36 1.57 68
10 years 7 2.73 2.27 18
results for each run, infrastructure, and time horizon combination.
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Figure 5.16: Performance and endogenous preference for a ten year time horizon
110
5.4.6 Hurricane Threat Case Study Discussion and Conclusion
The single storms experiment showed the expected decrease in resilience as
storm strength increases. The Hurricane Maria data lies at the edge of the resilience
values in Figure 5.14.
When the resilience data was differentiated by storm strength, the infras-
tructure system showed strong resilience to category 1 and 2 storms (Figure 5.15).
Information technology showed a great difference between category 2 storms and
stronger storms where the resilience value begins to decrease. From a stakeholder
perspective, information technology and transportation stakeholders may consider
improving electrical storage capacity when faced with longer lasting power outages.
The resilience decreased for the longer time horizon for all infrastructures
(Figure 5.17). Communications, emergency services, and healthcare exhibited very
little spread in resilience for all time horizons which suggested that changes in the
endogenous preference are resilience drivers rather than hurricanes. This finding
would effect the negotiation framework when capital must be allocated for the dif-
ferent infrastructures. Stakeholders for communications, emergency services, and
healthcare would argue for more capacity independent of storm arrival as opposed
to improving the electrical grid in response to hurricane caused power outages. On
the other hand, critical manufacturing and transportation stakeholders would argue
for improved electrical buffers for their infrastructures and/or improvement in the
electrical grid response to storms, especially the category 3, 4, and 5 storms.
This hurricane threat study demonstrated the hybrid resilience framework in
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Table 5.11: Resilience Results
Stakeholder Profile 6 Month 1 Year 2 Year
Infrastructure Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
Communications 0.99 0.98–0.99 0.99 0.98–0.99 0.98 0.97–0.98
Critical Manufacturing 0.99 0.77–0.99 0.97 0.76–0.98 0.95 0.75–0.97
Electricity Availability 1.00 0.86–1.00 0.99 0.87–1.00 0.99 0.82–1.00
Emergency Services 1.00 1.00–1.00 1.00 1.00–1.00 1.00 1.00–1.00
Healthcare 1.00 1.00–1.00 1.00 1.00–1.00 1.00 0.96–1.00
Information Technology 1.00 0.87–1.00 1.00 0.76–1.00 0.99 0.49–1.00
Transportation 0.94 0.64–0.95 0.93 0.64–0.95 0.91 0.64–0.94
Water 1.00 0.88–1.00 0.99 0.87–0.99 0.98 0.82–0.99
Stakeholder Profile 5 Year 10 Year Post-Maria
Infrastructure Mean Range Mean Range Puerto Rico
Communications 0.95 0.95–0.95 0.91 0.91–0.91
Critical Manufacturing 0.89 0.69–0.93 0.80 0.63–0.87
Electricity Availability 0.98 0.77–1.00 0.96 0.75–1.00 0.61
Emergency Services 1.00 1.00–1.00 0.99 0.95–1.00
Healthcare 1.00 0.90–1.00 0.95 0.83–0.96
Information Technology 0.98 0.32–1.00 0.96 0.25–1.00
Transportation 0.87 0.60–0.92 0.80 0.56–0.89
Water 0.96 0.76–0.98 0.92 0.72–0.95
the context of critical infrastructure response to extended power outages from hur-
ricanes. The hybrid resilience framework was unique in that it explicitly considered
stakeholder preferences including the quantity of functional output and the time
horizon of consideration. The study included simulated data and data collected
from the field in Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. The hybrid
model enabled resilience analysis comparison among different types of systems and
types of modeling techniques for the systems.
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Figure 5.17: Resilience values for each time horizon and infrastructure pair
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Chapter 6: Fleet Resilience Case Study
6.1 Department of Defense Sustainability Challenges
Aging systems must operate past their planned lifetimes to compensate for
these delays. This life extension has reliability, safety, and operational implications.
One method to deal with the problems of aging systems is a System Life Exten-
sion Program (SLEP). A SLEP extends the lifetime and often adds capability to
an aging system. Many government systems are undergoing SLEP including the
Army Tactical Missile System [The Office of the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, 2017, Zacks Equity Research, 2015], weather radars [Radar Operations
Center, 2018], ships [Eckstein, 2018, Naval Sea Systems Command, 2018], and air-
craft [Garbarino, 2018, Jennings, 2018, Lockheed Martin Public Relations, 2017,
Tirpak, 2015]
This case study developed a discrete event simulation for the flight operations
of a squadron of aircraft; defined the critical functional outputs of the simulation
in the context of two stakeholders’ preferences; and defined stakeholder preference
profiles informed by the key functional outputs of the system and threats to mis-
sion assurance. Stakeholder preferences profiles included time horizon, endogenous
preference, and intertemporal substitutability. The discrete nature of the functional
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outputs of the simulation required modification of the extended Integral Resilience
model. The case study also expanded the options for modeling stakeholder in-
tertemporal substitutability to include event- and time-dependent values for χ. The
study demonstrated the impact of changes to a stakeholder’s preference model to
the resilience of the system.
6.2 Case Study: Training Squadron of Aircraft
This case study was based upon current jet trainers, the T-45 Goshawk (Fig-
ure 6.1) and T-38 Talon (Figure 6.2), in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. These
aircraft, along with instructor pilots, provide training to prepare pilots for flying
advanced tactical aircraft. Trainer aircraft require less maintenance, and less cost
than tactical aircraft. The T-X aircraft is the oft-delayed replacement for the T-38
[Mehta, 2013, Roberts, 2011]. No replacement yet exists for the T-45; The T-45 is
undergoing SLEP to increase its operational lifetime. The T-45 SLEP includes de-
tailed inspections, preventive parts replacement, corrosion control, and crack control
[Jennings, 2018].
When possible, the study used unclassified US Navy documents available via
official DoD websites to guide development of the simulation. In cases where infor-
mation is missing, the authors made simulation decisions consistent with personal
experience and with the goal of making the simulation tractable.
One course of action to mitigate the current DoD challenges regarding aging
systems and delayed acquisitions[Burgess, 2015, LaGrone, 2016] is SLEP of the aging
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Figure 6.1: T-45 Goshawks on the flightline [Sgt. Dengrier M. Baez, 2015]
system. SLEP can mitigate a host of problems:
• Parts obsolescence [Tomczykowski, 2001]
• Part wear-out [Jennings, 2018]
• Capability improvement [Burgess, 2015]
A SLEP defines the systems to modify, amount of life to add, number of
systems to SLEP, and when the SLEP should occur in the lifetime of the system.
The impact of the decisions often occur well beyond the careers of the people who
make them. Therefore, considering the time horizon of the individuals is important.
Figure 6.3 depicts the hybrid resilience framework for the training squadron
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Figure 6.2: T-38 Talon [Roberts, 2011]
case study. The system of interest was the training squadron comprising aircrew and
aircraft. Threats to the system were delays in fielding a replacement aircraft and a
surge in graduate pilot production. The two stakeholders, program managers and
squadron commanding officers, shared two functional outputs: graduation per quar-
ter and satisfaction rate. Program managers were also concerned with the daily
aircraft ready for flight. The stakeholders had different preference profiles (time
horizon, endogenous preference, and intertemporal substitutability) for each func-
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Figure 6.3: Case study hybrid resilience framework
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6.3 Training Squadron Simulation
The simulation used the SimPy [Lünsdorf and Scherfke, 2018] package in Ana-
conda Python 3.5 [Anaconda Inc., 2016]. SimPy contains capability to define a
simulation environment, processes, and resources. The squadron simulation com-
prised two primary objects: aircrew and aircraft. Multiple processes, defined by
a scheduler object, determined which aircraft and aircrew were available for a slot
in the flight schedule, and matched the available aircraft and aircrew to conduct a
training event.
Figure 6.4 depicts the simulation flow. The simulation revolved around flight
events. A flight required a student, an instructor, and an aircraft. At the completion
of the flight, each component of the aircraft was either ready to fly in the next
event (up) or required a maintenance action (down). If a component was down,
maintenance personnel repaired the aircraft to return it to the flightline. After a
flight, the component’s expended life could trigger aircraft retirement or move to
the SLEP queue. Instructors graded students after each flight. The grades were
pass/fail. After a certain number of passing flights, the student graduated and
placed in the graduate pool for assignment to a tactical squadron.
The scenarios defined the possibilities for system behavior and threats to the
system under consideration. The system was a fleet of 50 aircraft with a monthly
matriculation of 25 students. Matriculation numbers were drawn from a uniform
distribution from 18 to 32. The original (pre-SLEP) aircraft lifetime was 7,200
hours. Under this normal operating procedure, the aircraft lasted just beyond the
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Figure 6.4: Squadron fleet operation flow of events
planned end of life, or fifteen years (Table 6.1).
The motivating problem was a change in sundown date due to a delay in the
procurement of a follow-on training aircraft. To solve this problem the program
manager initiated a SLEP for the airframe. As each aircraft approached is life limit,
it entered the SLEP queue to receive modifications to enhance the lifetime. The
study looked at extending operational use of the fleet in five year increments from
15 years (original lifetime) to 35 years. The study completed 1,660 runs of each
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combination of SLEP scenarios, student surge scenarios, and stakeholder preference
profile. Each combination of functional output, SLEP course of action, and student
surge status met a stopping criterion of less than 1% standard error on the mean
[Sandborn, 2013].
The following sections define the simulation entities in more detail.





Aircraft Lifetime 7,200 Hours
Aircraft SLEP trigger 7,000 Hours
Minimum Class Size 18
Maximum Class Size 32
6.3.1 Aircraft Model
An aircraft comprised three parts: an airframe, avionics, and propulsion. A
part had a lifetime, a repair time, a failure rate. Part failure rates depended upon
flight hours only. An exponential distribution with λ set as depicted in Table 6.2
represented the parts’ time to failure. Repair quality was to good-as-new using a
log-normal distribution to model the time to repair.
Each part subclass, airframe, avionics, and propulsion, could have its own
failure and repair distribution parameters, SLEP trigger time, lifetime, and lifetime
added through SLEP. For this study, the airframe is the part of primary significance
and was the only part to limit the aircraft lifetime and receive SLEP.
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Table 6.2: Aircraft Simulation Values
Part Characteristic Value (Hours)
Airframe
Average Time to Failure
Average Time to Repair





Average Time to Failure




Average Time to Failure




The aircrew class included students and instructors. Both students and in-
structors recorded hours flown for the aircrew. Instructors could fly up to three
flights a day. A student graduated from the curriculum with 61 complete flights and
less than 4 failed flights [Chief of Naval Air Training, 2009]. The student entered the
“graduated students” pool when the curriculum is complete. The student entered
the “attrited students” pool after failing four flights. Each flight had a 3.5% chance
to result in a failure. Over the course of 61 graded flights, a student had an 84 %
chance to graduate the syllabus. If a part on the aircraft failed during the flight,
the flight grad was incomplete, and must be re-flown. The student had no limits to
incomplete flights. A student could fly up to two flights per day. The simulation
began with a set amount of students. Every 30 days, a new class of students matric-
ulated into the flight program. A uniform distribution for 70-130% of the average
class size provided variation in the class size per month. Table 6.3 summarizes the
students parameters. The class size changed to reflect the fluctuating demand of
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the squadron commander stakeholder.
Table 6.3: Model Parameter Values for Students and Instructors
Parameter Student Value Instructor Value
Events per Day 2 3
Events in Curriculum 61 NA
Event Failure Rate 3.5% NA
Failed Events Allowed 3 NA
6.3.3 SLEP Simulation
The program manager faced three different SLEP strategies: “No SLEP”,
“Small SLEP,” and “Large SLEP.” “No SLEP” did not add any life to the aircraft,
but it also avoided taking aircraft out of the flight schedule for the extended time
required to conduct SLEP. “Small SLEP” increased the lifetime of the aircraft to
14,400 flight hours but removed aircraft from the flightline for 9 months. “Large
SLEP” increased the lifetime of the aircraft to 18,000 flight hours but removed
aircraft from the flightline for 12 months.
An aircraft entered the SLEP queue when it reaches its SLEP flight hour
limit. The SLEP line had a limited number of slots available in the hangar, so the
program manager gradually introduced aircraft to the SLEP line. The simulation




The scheduler defined flight days, flight events, and matched instructors, stu-
dents and aircraft for the flight. The scheduler used a simplified calendar with a
five-day flying week and two day weekend with maintenance but no flying. Each
flying day had 4 flight events with start times spaced by 3 hours. The scheduler
used a uniform distribution to select a flight time between 0.5 and 2.0 hours for a
single event. For each event, the scheduler made student-instructor-aircraft matches
for each event until one of the pools is exhausted. The potential results of a flight
were:
• Student outcomes:
– Flight incomplete due to aircraft failure
– Passing flight for the student




– Send to SLEP line
– End of life
The scheduler updated all the objects involved in the flight: adds flight hours
added to the aircraft and parts; updates student syllabus completion data; assesses
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student status (graduate, attrite, continue); adds a new class of students monthly;
assesses aircraft repair status (up or down); assesses aircraft flightline status (flight-
line, SLEP line, end of life); and assesses status of aircraft in the SLEP line (waiting,
in-SLEP, complete).
6.4 Stakeholder Preference Profiles: Intertemporal Substitutability
The value of χ could be constant for the entire time horizon, or it could
be dependent upon time and/or events. Two special values of χ are the ephemeral
(χ = 0) case and permanent (χ = 1) case. The ephemeral case allows no substitution
across time. When the system had a shortage at time tj, surplus from time ti had no
value. In the permanent case, a surplus retained its full value or utility throughout
the time horizon. Any surplus at time ti had full value at time tj. Earlier studies
addressed these cases as well as fractions of the permanent case which remained
constant throughout the time horizon.
The adjacent case of intertemporal substitutability enabled time- and event-
dependent surplus “transfer” from time steps adjacent to a time step with a shortfall.
A coefficient moderates the “transfer” value, decreasing the value of substitution as
tn moves further away from the shortfall time. Intertemporal substitutability (χ)
became a scalar two-column matrix of an arbitrary length (Table 6.4). The first
column was an index (j) defining the amount of steps from the shortfall that is
transferable. The second column was the fraction of transferable surplus. Using
Table 6.4 as an example, 75% of surplus occurring one time step after shortfall was
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available to transfer while 100% of surplus one time step before the shortfall was
available to transfer.










The following proposed algorithm applied a surplus to shortfall substitution for
an arbitrary number of steps away from the performance shortfall. The algorithm
assumed the surpluses closest in time to the shortfalls were first to transfer. Ta-
ble 6.5 defines the key terminology in the algorithm and figures 6.5 through 6.10
demonstrate the algorithm for surpluses occurring before the shortfall.
1. Define the indices (j) and the fraction of substitutability (χj) for the intertem-
poral substitutability matrix.
2. Find a performance shortfall, ϕt < Qt. This defines the time (t) of the shortfall
3. Calculate the transferable surplus from the closest index (j) before the short-
fall, ψt,j = χj(ϕt−j −Qt−j)
4. If ϕt + ψt,j < Qt,
(a) set ϕt : ϕt + ψt,j and ϕt−j : Qt−j.
(b) Return to Step 2.
5. If ϕt + ψt,j ≥ Qt,
(a) Set ϕt : Qt





(c) Return to Step 3 with j one step further from the current replacement
step.
6. If ϕt < qt and no surplus remains, return to Step 3 and apply surplus occurring
after the shortfall.
7. When all available surpluses are exhausted, set ϕ for all remaining surpluses to
Qt. This step ensures that the resilience analytic model does not incorporate
inaccessible surpluses. The result is ϕ̃t
The adjacent intertemporal substitutability algorithm allowed a stakeholder to
account for the value of surplus before and after a disturbance causing a shortfall in
desired functional output of the system. The fleet resilience case study demonstrated
the algorithm.
Table 6.5: Intertemporal Substitutability Terminology
Symbol Definition
ϕt Performance at time t
Qt Endogenous preference at time t
χj Intertemporal substitution coefficient j time steps from time t
ψt,j Transferable surplus at j time steps from time t
ϕ̃t Modified performance at time t
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Figure 6.5: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: The left
portion of the figure defines the χ matrix (Step 1). The first shortfall
occurs at t = 4 (Step 2).
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Figure 6.6: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: the avail-
able surplus ψ applied to t = 4 using j = −1 (Step 3).
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Figure 6.7: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: the sur-
plus from t = 3 cannot overcome the shortfall (Step 4). This transfer
expended all surplus from t = 3 (Step 4a), and the algorithm transferred
surplus from one step further, t = 4 (Step 3).
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Figure 6.8: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: transfer
satisfied the shortfall with surplus remaining at t = 2 (Step5). With
t = 4 satisfied, the algorithm found the next shortfall at t = 5. The
first two time steps, t = 4&3 are exhausted, so the algorithm transferred
surplus from t = 2, three steps before t = 5. This transfer exhausted the
surplus from t = 2 (ψ5,3).
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Figure 6.9: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: the entire
surplus from t = 1 transferred to t = 5
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Figure 6.10: Intertemporal substitutability algorithm example: the total
available surplus from Figure 6.5 cannot satisfy the shortfall during the
distribution. The algorithm is completed and produced the modified
functional output ϕ̃t.
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6.5 Resilience Analytical Model
The extended Integral Resilience model was:
REIR =
Mχ∆Ti + Fχ∆Tf +Rχ∆Tr +Hχ∆Th
∆Ti + ∆Tf + ∆Tr + ∆Th
(6.1)















for ϕ(t) > Q(t)
(6.2)
This formulation was inappropriate for the functional outputs of the discrete event
simulation. The study developed a discrete representation of the extended Inte-
gral Resilience. The overall equation for resilience, R, remains unchanged, but the

























for χt = adjacent
(6.3)
6.6 Hybrid Resilience Framework Demonstration
The study had two main thrusts of inquiry. One effort demonstrated the
hybrid resilience framework in the domain of a fleet of systems satisfying multi-
ple stakeholders with multiple preference profiles. The other effort demonstrated
the adjacent intertemporal substitutability algorithm and how it affected resilience
outcomes.
6.6.1 Stakeholder Profiles
The study defined two stakeholder profiles: squadron commanders and the pro-
gram manager. Table 6.8 shows the functional outputs of interest and the associated
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values for time horizon, endogenous preference, and intertemporal substitutability
for each stakeholder.
The program manager was responsible for maintaining the viability of the
fleet of aircraft until a replacement system was operational. The program manager
desired a certain fraction of aircraft ready to provide training events at the beginning
of each fly day. The program manager ensured the flight system produces the desired
graduates per quarter over its lifetime and that student satisfaction rate (fraction of
students graduating under a certain time threshold) was reasonable. The program
manager’s time horizon was uncertain. The study investigated time horizon values
of 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 years of aircraft operations.
The commanding officer had two functional outputs of interest: graduates per
quarter and satisfaction rate. Squadron Commanders had tenures lasting three-
years. This tenure defined their time horizon th. Although, in reality, Squadron
Commanders are conscientious individuals, the simulation treated them as individ-
uals singularly focused upon their period of command with no concern of health
of the fleet before or after them. From the squadron commanders’ perspectives,
a graduate surplus during one quarter could have value transferable to the previ-
ous or following quarter. The study investigated different types of intertemporal
substitutability including ephemeral, permanent, and adjacent values. Graduate
satisfaction rates were ephemeral (χ = 0).
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6.6.2 Study Scenarios
The program manager had three courses of action for supporting the aircraft
(Table 6.6): do nothing (“No SLEP”), increase the operational life to 14,400 flight
hours (“Small SLEP”), or increase the operational life to 18,000 flight hours (“Large
SLEP”). The program manager also considered a change in demand for graduates.
This study investigated the impact of a two year “surge” of desired graduates man-
ifested by larger incoming classes and an increase in endogenous need. During a
surge period, the average class size increased to 35 per month from a normal size of
25. The demand for students increased from 65 students per quarter to 90 students
per quarter.
Table 6.6: SLEP Courses of Action
Course of Action post-SLEP Lifetime Time To SLEP (months)
No SLEP NA (7,200) NA
Small SLEP 14,400 6
Large SLEP 18,000 9








Normal 18 32 65
Surge 25 41 90
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Table 6.8: Stakeholder Preference Profile



























6.6.3 Intertemporal Substitutability Investigation
The study conducted an exploration of intertemporal substitutability values
applied to the algorithm described above. The adjacent intertemporal substitutabil-
ity applied to the graduates per quarter functional output. Simulation data post-
processing applied 12 different values for χ to graduates per quarter. The values for
χ adjusted the amount of time steps that had value, the coefficient of the value, and
whether surplus before and after had an impact. Table 6.9 shows the values used.
Negative time steps are time steps before the shortfall while positive time steps are
after the shortfall.
Table 6.9: Values for χ Matrices
Index (j)
Case -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4
Substitute only after shortfall
A1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
A2 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.25 0 0
A3 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0
A4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1. . .
Substitute only before shortfall
B1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
B2 0 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0
B3 0 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0
B4 . . . 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Substitute before & after shortfall
C1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0
C3 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0 0
C4 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
Ephemeral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Permanent . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. . .
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6.7 Simulation Outputs
The discrete event simulation produced time-series data for aircraft disposition
and status status; graduates, attrited students, and matriculated students; and time
to graduate for each student. Figures 6.11 shows an example run for the “No surge”
scenarios for each course of action. The solid line is the number of aircraft on the
flightline, the dashed line is the desired number of graduates per quarter, and the
points are the actual number of graduates in a quarter. Figure 6.12 shows the same
information for the “Surge” scenario. The shaded area from 12-14 years highlights
the two year surge in required graduates.
6.7.1 Resilience Results
The configuration of the boxplots show the maximum, minimum and quartiles
of the resilience values. The ends of the vertical lines are the maximum and minimum
resilience; the top and bottom edges of the box are the 75th and 25th percentiles;









































































































































Figure 6.12: Flightline size and quarterly graduates for a single run: surge
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6.8 Program Manager Perspective
The hybrid resilience framework applied the program manager’s preference
(Table 6.8) profiles to the desired functional outputs using the discrete extended
Integral Resilience analytical model. Each functional output has its own figure
depicting the the program manager resilience results. This presentation enables
visual inspection of the preferred course of action. Figure 6.13 shows results for the
daily aircraft ready to fly functional output. Figure 6.14 shows surge and non-surge
results for the graduates per quarter output over all time horizons of interest and for
the ephemeral and permanent values of χ. Figure 6.15 shows results for the student
satisfaction functional output. Table 6.10 shows the program manager’s preferred
course of action for each functional outputs’ resilience at each time horizon. In the
table, “Adjacent” refers to case C4.
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Figure 6.13: Program manager daily ready aircraft resilience results for 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 year time horizons
with and without a surge in student matriculation
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Intertemporal Substitutability Ephemeral Permanent
Figure 6.14: Program manager graduate resilience results for 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 year time horizons with and
without a surge in student matriculation ephemeral and permanent intertemporal substitutability profiles
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Figure 6.15: Program manager satisfaction resilience results for 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 year time horizons with and
without a surge in student matriculation.
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15 No SLEP No SLEP Small All
20 Small Small Small Large & Small
25 Small Small Small Large & Small
30 Small Small Small Large & Small
35 Large Large Large Large
Surge
15 No SLEP No SLEP Small Large & Small
20 Small Small Small Large & Small
25 Small Small Small Large & Small
30 Small Small Large Large & Small
35 Large Large Large Large
6.9 Squadron Commander Perspective
The Squadron Commander applied the preference profiles and functional out-
puts defined in Table 6.8. Every Squadron Commander had a three year time hori-
zon. The squadron commanders each have an alphabetical identifier. Time periods
with all aircraft life expended had no commanding officers. The first command-
ing officer was Commander Alpha (A). The “No SLEP” course of action typically
ended with Commander Foxtrot (F); the “Large SLEP” course of action ended with
Commander November (N); and the “Small SLEP” course of action usually ended
with Commander Kilo (K), but occasionally reached Commander Lima. When a
simulation exhausts all aircraft flight hours, the Commander receives no resilience
value.
Figure 6.17 shows the resilience results for graduates per quarter for three
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intertemporal substitutability values: the ephemeral case, the permanent case and
adjacent case C3 (Table 6.9). Figure 6.16 shows the results for resilience of satisfied
graduates (less than 60 days in the squadron) for each course of action and surge
status.
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Figure 6.16: Squadron commander student satisfaction resilience results
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Figure 6.17: Squadron commander graduates resilience results (χ = 0)
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6.10 Intertemporal Substitutability Investigation
The second part of this study focused on implementing the Intertemporal
Substitutability algorithm. The study applied 12 adjacent algorithms and the pre-
existing permanent and ephemeral cases. Intertemporal substitutability applied to
the graduates per quarter functional output of the simulation. Figures 6.18, 6.19,
6.20, 6.21, and 6.22 show the change in resilience as the intertemporal substitutabil-
ity changes for the program manager.
Figures 6.23 and 6.24 show the resilience values for all intertemporal substi-
tutability preferences from the perspective of Commanders Delta and Echo. The
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Course of Action Small SLEP Large SLEP
Figure 6.19: Program manager intertemporal substitutability, 20 year time horizon. “No SLEP” course of action























Course of Action Small SLEP Large SLEP
Figure 6.20: Program manager intertemporal substitutability, 25 year time horizon. “No SLEP” course of action























Course of Action Small SLEP Large SLEP
Figure 6.21: Program manager intertemporal substitutability, 30 year time horizon. “No SLEP” course of action























Course of Action Small SLEP Large SLEP
Figure 6.22: Program manager intertemporal substitutability, 35 year time horizon. “No SLEP” course of action





















Course of Action No SLEP Small SLEP Large SLEP

























Course of Action No SLEP Small SLEP Large SLEP
Figure 6.24: Commander Echo intertemporal substitutability
158
6.11 Hybrid Resilience Framework Demonstration Discussion
The study applied a hybrid resilience framework to a flight training squadron.
The framework produced nuanced results to inf. The preferred most-resilient solu-
tion varied from stakeholder to stakeholder and within stakeholders from output to
output.
The results show resilience to be dependent upon time horizon for the program
manager. With no delay in fielding a replacement system, the “No SLEP” course
of action has the highest resilience in ready aircraft and student satisfaction. From
20-30 years, “No SLEP” becomes untenable, and the “Small SLEP” course of action
has a slight advantage over the “Large SLEP” course of action. The “Large SLEP”
is the only tenable course of action at 35 years. The program manager would also
look at resilience from the Commanding Officers’ perspective. The program manager
should avoid courses of action that makes it impossible for a Commanding Officer to
meet their quotas. Figure 6.16 shows the sacrifice the Commanding Officers would
make. The “No SLEP” course of action almost guarantees meeting the student
satisfaction goals with “Small SLEP” and “Large SLEP” becoming worse.
6.12 Algorithm Demonstration Discussion
The study demonstrated a novel intertemporal substitutability algorithm. The
algorithm enabled time and event dependent surplus substitutability. The algo-
rithm prepped the graduates per quarter time-series data for the resilience analytical
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model. Figures 6.14, 6.18-6.22, and 6.23-6.24 show these results. The algorithm dif-
ferentiates between surplus before and after a shortfall. The permanent case showed
little decision support when a course of action was viable (Figures 6.18, 6.19, 6.20,
6.21, and 6.22) as the bulk of the resilience values went to one. The intertemporal
substitutability demonstrated case-to-case resilience changes . The trend fits with
intuition with an increasing trend when more time steps surplus percentage are
available to transfer.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion, Contributions, and Future Work
This chapter summarizes this dissertation’s accomplishments, the contribution
to the state of the art, and direction for future work in the area of resilience.
7.1 Summary
Chapter 1 reviewed the historical usage of resilience and the current state
of the art of resilience modeling. Chapter 2 identified three gaps in the literature
and laid out research objectives intended to fill the gaps. Chapter 3 described the
methodology for the studies. The chapter defined the analysis steps that make up
the hybrid resilience framework; defined and applied the criteria for choosing the
resilience models included in the study; and extended the resilience models to in-
clude stakeholder preferences. Chapter 4 conducted the resilience model comparison
using fundamental models of performance and stakeholder preference. Chapter 5
performed additional resilience model comparisons using a system dynamics model
of the critical infrastructure systems of the city of Austin, TX. The infrastructure
case study applied the hybrid resilience framework, using extended Integral Re-
silience as the analytical resilience model, to DOE field data collected from Puerto
Rico during the recovery from Hurricane Maria damage and to a Monte Carlo model
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of a city under the threat of hurricane landfall. Chapter 6 applied the hybrid re-
silience framework to a fleet of aircraft with program manager and commanding
officer stakeholders. The study developed a discrete version extended Integral Re-
silience model and demonstrated an algorithm to apply time- and event-dependent
intertemporal substitutability.
7.2 Contributions
The first gap in the resilience state-of-the-art was a lack of stakeholder input.
The first research objective filled this gap. The following comparison of models
resulted in selection of the extended Integral Resilience model for use in the hybrid
resilience model. This is the first work to explicitly define key stakeholder preferences
and incorporate them into resilience models in such a way as to be system agnostic.
The second gap in the resilience state-of-the-art was a lack of model-to-model
comparisons. While earlier studies had considered time horizon [Ayyub, 2015] and
endogenous preference [Ouyang et al., 2012], this course of study was first to assess
resilience model performance when changing these parameters. The study found
extended Integral Resilience sensitive to the most parameters in the fundamental
models of performance and preference.
The third gap was lack of a portable resilience methodology to apply to sys-
tems and systems of systems in a uniform way. The hybrid resilience framework fills
this gap. The class III hybrid model defined by Shanthikumar and Sargent [1983]
served as the foundation for the development of the hybrid resilience model. The
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case studies demonstrated the framework’s portability to different domains and its
ability to differentiate different courses of action depending upon the stakeholders’
preference profiles. The infrastructure resilience case study demonstrated the frame-
work using deterministic, stochastic, and real-life data sources and applied them to
multiple stakeholders developed a time and event dependent algorithm for applying
a stakeholder’s intertemporal substitutability.
The course of study achieved the identified research objectives. Chapter 3
developed the hybrid resilience framework based upon the class III hybrid simula-
tion/analytic model (Research objective 1). Chapters 4 and 5 conceptually vali-
dated the resilience models in the context of the hybrid resilience framework. The
conceptual validation activity applied fundamental models and the infrastructure
case study to the eight analytic resilience models developed in the study (Research
objective 2). The critical infrastructure and training fleet case studies demonstrated
the hybrid resilience framework and the extended integral resilience model using data
generated from operating systems and two different types of simulations (Research
Objective 3).
7.3 Future Work
Future research opportunities exist within the resilience model, the applica-




The dissertation investigated a single intertemporal substitutability algorithm;
an algorithm that selected filled shortfalls with the most recent surplus. Other
algorithms, such as using the oldest surplus first, may yield different results. The
method for filling a shortfall may itself be a preference defined by the stakeholder. A
course of study could investigate developing optimal intertemporal substitutability
algorithms to suggest strategies for surplus storage and usage by the stakeholder.
Future work could investigate and assess the value of incorporating additional
stakeholder preferences into the hybrid resilience framework. The study identified
three different stakeholder preferences. These serve as a foundation as time horizon
and endogenous preference were implicit in many studies. Intertemporal substi-
tutability became available after defining these two preferences. Other preferences
may be available in the fields of economics, operations research, human factors, and
psychology.
7.3.2 Case Studies
The training squadron discrete event simulation held many parameters con-
stant for this study. The study could investigate the impact of: different reliability
profiles for the systems; SLEP applied to the propulsion and avionics systems; in-
structor pilots and the maintenance personnel as stakeholders with their own prefer-
ence sets; and simulating additional disturbances to the squadron such as inclement
weather, total aircraft loss due to accidents, and variable student surge events.
164
Many opportunities exist to apply the hybrid resilience framework. This course
of study applied the hybrid model to two systems. The portability and flexibility of
the framework enables resilience analysis to a spectrum of systems and systems of
systems.
7.3.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis
A potentially powerful course of research is integrating the hybrid resilience
framework with a benefit-cost analysis as described by Ayyub [2014a]. The disser-
tation does not address monetary costs, which is a shortcoming from stakeholders’
perspective. The hybrid resilience framework could become a key component of a
larger analysis methodology incorporating cost.
7.4 Conclusion
In summary, the dissertation made significant contributions to both the prac-
tical application of resilience and the theory of resilience. Incorporating stakeholder
preferences in the resilience models improved the quality of decision support from the
models. The hybrid resilience framework is extensible to other systems, additional
stakeholder preferences, and novel resilience analytical models.
165
Bibliography
David L. Alderson, Gerald G. Brown, W. Matthew Carlyle, and R. Kevin Wood.
Solving Defender-Attacker-Defender models for infrastructure defense. 12th IN-
FORMS Computing Society Conference, pages 28–49, 2011. doi: 10.1287/ics.2011.
0047. URL http://www.informs.org/Community/Conferences/ICS2011.
David L Alderson, Gerald G Brown, and W Matthew Carlyle. Assessing and
improving operational resilience of critical infrastructures and other systems.
In TutORials in Operations Research INFORMS, pages 180–215, 2014. ISBN
9780984337859.
David L. Alderson, Gerald G. Brown, and W. Matthew Carlyle. Operational models
of infrastructure resilience. Risk Analysis, 35(4):562–586, 2015. ISSN 15396924.
doi: 10.1111/risa.12333.
D. E. Alexander. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: An etymological jour-
ney. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 13(11):2707–2716, 2013. ISSN
15618633. doi: 10.5194/nhess-13-2707-2013.
American Society of Civil Engineers. Infrastructure Resilience Division, 2017.
URL http://www.asce.org/infrastructure-resilience/infrastructure-
resilience-division/.
Anaconda Inc. Anaconda Software Distribution, 2016. URL https://anaconda.
com/.
Austin Energy. City of Austin service area map, 2013. URL https://
austinenergy.com/ae/about/company-profile/electric-system/service-
area-map.
Terje Aven. Foundations of Risk Analysis. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, West Sussex,
2003. ISBN 0-471-49548-4.
Bilal M Ayyub. Systems resilience for multihazard environments: definition, met-
rics, and valuation for decision making. Risk Analysis, 34(2):340–55, 2 2014a.
ISSN 1539-6924. doi: 10.1111/risa.12093. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/23875704.
166
Bilal M. Ayyub. Systems resilience for multihazard environments: Definition, met-
rics, and valuation for decision making. Risk Analysis, 34(2):340–355, 2014b.
ISSN 02724332. doi: 10.1111/risa.12093.
Bilal M. Ayyub. Risk Analysis in Engineering and Economics. Francis & Taylor,
Boca Raton, FL, second edition, 2014c. ISBN 9781466518254.
Bilal M Ayyub. Practical Resilience Metrics for Planning, Design, and Decision
Making. ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems,
pages 1–11, 2015. doi: 10.1061/AJRUA6.0000826.
Bilal M Ayyub and George J Klir. Uncertainty Modeling and Analysis in Engineering
and the Sciences. 2006. ISBN 1584886447. doi: 10.1201/9781420011456.
Kash Barker, Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez, and Claudio M. Rocco. Resilience-based
network component importance measures. Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, 117:89–97, 9 2013. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2013.03.012. URL
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0951832013000823.
Kash Barker, Charles D Nicholson, and Jose E Ramirez-Marquez. Vulnerability im-
portance measures toward resilience-based network design. In 12th International
Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, Van-
couver, 2015. ICASP12.
Hiba Baroud, Kash Barker, Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez, and Claudio M. Rocco.
Importance measures for inland waterway network resilience. Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 62:55–67, 2014. ISSN
13665545. doi: 10.1016/j.tre.2013.11.010. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.tre.2013.11.010.
Bill Bartkus. Naval Air Depot North Island Begins SLEP on Greyhounds, 2002.
URL http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1161.
John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles. A Dictionary of Economics.
Oxford University Press, fifth edition, 2017. ISBN 9780191819940. doi: 10.1093/
acref/9780198759430.001.0001. URL http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/
10.1093/acref/9780198759430.001.0001/acref-9780198759430.
Dan Broadstreet. Navy Modernizes Amphibious Ships and Hovercraft, 2007. URL
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=34023.
Michel Bruneau, Stephanie E. Chang, Ronald T. Eguchi, George C. Lee,
Thomas D. O’Rourke, Andrei M. Reinhorn, Masanobu Shinozuka, Kathleen Tier-
ney, William A. Wallace, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. A Framework to Quanti-
tatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of Communities. Earthquake
Spectra, 19(4):733–752, 2003. ISSN 87552930. doi: 10.1193/1.1623497.
167
Richard R. Burgess. Navy to Modify T-45 Training Jets for Improved Perfor-
mance, 2015. URL http://hrana.org/news/2015/07/navy-to-modify-t-45-
training-jets-for-improved-performance/.
Steve Carpenter, Brian Walker, J. Marty Anderies, and Nick Abel. From Metaphor
to Measurement: Resilience of What to What? Ecosystems, 4(8):765–781, 2001.
ISSN 14329840. doi: 10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9.
Binchao Chen, Aaron Phillips, and Timothy I. Matis. Two-terminal reliabil-
ity of a mobile ad hoc network under the asymptotic spatial distribution of
the random waypoint model. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 106:
72–79, 10 2012. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2012.05.005. URL http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0951832012000889.
L. Chen and E. Miller-Hooks. Resilience: An Indicator of Recovery Capability in
Intermodal Freight Transport. Transportation Science, 46(1):109–123, 2012. ISSN
0041-1655. doi: 10.1287/trsc.1110.0376.
Chief of Naval Air Training. CNATRAINST 1542.160: T-45 Combined Strike Flight
Instructor Training Curriculum. Technical Report May, Naval Air Training Com-
mand, 2009.
C. A. Davis, T. D. O’Rourke, M. L. Adams, and M. A. Rho. Case Study: Los
Angeles Water Services Restoration Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake.
In Proceedings of the 15th World Conference Earthquake Engineering, Lisbon,
2012.
Craig A. Davis. Water system service categories, postearthquake interaction, and
restoration strategies. Earthquake Spectra, 30(4):1487–1509, 2014. ISSN 87552930.
doi: 10.1193/022912EQS058M.
Harold Demsetz. The core disagreement between Pigou, the profession, and Coase in
the analyses of the externality question. European Journal of Political Economy,
12(4):565–579, 1996. ISSN 01762680. doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00025-0.
Department of Defense. Mission Assurance (DoD Directive 3020.40). Technical
report, Washington, DC, 2016.
Thomas Donaldson and Lee E Preston. Stakeholder Theory: Concepts, Evi-
dence, Corporations and its Implications. Management, 20(1):65–91, 1995. ISSN
03637425. doi: 10.2307/258887.
Megan Eckstein. Navy Will Extend All DDGs to a 45-Year Ser-




Jane Edwards. Report: Army Sees 4-Year Delay in Anti-Missile C2
System IOC Based on FY 2018 Budget Request, 2017. URL http:
//www.executivegov.com/2017/05/report-army-sees-4-year-delay-in-
anti-missile-c2-system-ioc-based-on-fy-2018-budget-request/.
Dane Egli, David Flanigan, Brian Donohue, Steven Taylor, Michael Newkirk, and
Richard Waddell. Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience: Resilience Imple-
mentation Proof of Concept Guidebook, 2015.
Roy N. Emanuel. Resilience and Stakeholder Need. In Reliability and Maintainability
Symposium. IEEE, 2017. ISBN 0814472605.
Roy N. Emanuel and Bilal M. Ayyub. Assessing Resilience Model Responsiveness
in the Context of Stakeholder Preferences in Decision Support Systems. ASCE-
ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, in press.
Royce A. Francis and Behailu Bekera. A metric and frameworks for resilience anal-
ysis of engineered and infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, 121:90–103, 1 2014. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2013.07.004. URL
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0951832013002147.
R. Edward Freeman. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Pitman
Publishing Inc., Marshfield, MA, 1984. ISBN 0-273-01913-9.
Dante Gama Dessavre, Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez, and Kash Barker. Multidimen-
sional approach to complex system resilience analysis. Reliability Engineering &
System Safety, 149:34–43, 2016. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2015.12.009.
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0951832015003610.
Mica Garbarino. F-16 Service Life Extension Program a great deal
for DoD, taxpayers, 2018. URL https://www.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/1516090/f-16-service-life-extension-program-a-
great-deal-for-dod-taxpayers/.
Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen, and Heriberto Cabezas. Panarchy , Adaptive
Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience Panarchy ,
Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience.
Nebraska Law Review, 87(4), 2008. URL http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/
vol87/iss4/5.
Simon R. Goerger, Azad M. Madni, and Owen J. Eslinger. Engineered resilient
systems: A DoD perspective. Procedia Computer Science, 28(Cser):865–872, 2014.
ISSN 18770509. doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.03.103. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.procs.2014.03.103.
Sam Goldstein and Robert B. Brooks, editors. Handbook of Resilience in Children.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
169
Devanandham Henry and Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez. Generic metrics and quan-
titative approaches for system resilience as a function of time. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety, 99:114–122, 3 2012. ISSN 09518320. doi:
10.1016/j.ress.2011.09.002. URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/
pii/S0951832011001748.
Devanandham Henry and Jose Emmanuel Ramirez-Marquez. On the Im-
pacts of Power Outages during Hurricane Sandy-A Resilience-Based Anal-






Arelis R. Hernández, Whitney Leaming, and Zoeann Murphy. How Puerto
Rico power outage affects citizens after Hurricane Maria - Washington Post,
2017. URL https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/
puerto-rico-life-without-power/?utm_term=.503469a1f0a1.
Jeffery P Holland. Engineered Resilient Systems. In NDIA Systems Engineering
Conference, Springfield, VA, 2014.
C. S. Holling. Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience. In Lance H.
Gunderson, Craig R. Allen, and C. S. Holling, editors, Foundations of Ecological
Resilience, chapter Article 2, pages 51–66. Island Press, Washington D.C., 2010.
ISBN 978-1-59726-511-9.
C.S. Holling. Resilience and the Stability of Ecological Systems. Annual Review
of Ecology and Systematics, 4(1973):1–23, 1973. URL http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2096802.
Seyedmohsen Hosseini, Kash Barker, and Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez. A Review of
Definitions and Measures of System Resilience. Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, 2015. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2015.08.006. URL http://
linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0951832015002483.
Idaho National Laboratories. Resilience Week, 2017. URL http://
resilienceweek.com.
INCOSE. What is Systems Engineering?, 2017. URL http://www.incose.org/
AboutSE/WhatIsSE.
Thomas Jagger, James B. Elsner, and Xufeng Niu. A Dynamic Probability Model
of Hurricane Winds in Coastal Counties of the United States. Journal of Applied
Meteorology, 40(5):853–863, 2001. ISSN 0894-8763. doi: 10.1175/1520-0450(2001)
040〈0853:ADPMOH〉2.0.CO;2.
170
Mo Jamshidi. Introduction to System of Systems. In Mo Jamshidi, editor, System
OF Systems Engineering: Innovations for the 21st Century, chapter 1, pages 1–20.
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2009. ISBN 9780470195901.
Gareth Jennings. Boeing continues T-45 SLEP effort with Phase 2 contract, 2018.
URL http://www.janes.com/article/77447/boeing-continues-t-45-slep-
effort-with-phase-2-contract.
Justin Katz. Zumwalt (DDG-1000) sees delays in path to IOC, 2018. URL https:
//insidedefense.com/insider/zumwalt-ddg-1000-sees-delays-path-ioc.
Xiangyong Kong, Liqun Gao, Haibin Ouyang, and Steven Li. Solving the re-
dundancy allocation problem with multiple strategy choices using a new sim-
plified particle swarm optimization. Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
144:147–158, 12 2015. ISSN 09518320. doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2015.07.019. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832015002240.
Sam LaGrone. Navy Lays Bare F/A-18 Hornet, Super Hornet Readiness Gaps,
2016. URL https://news.usni.org/2016/05/26/navy-lays-bare-fa-18-
readiness-gaps-take-year-surge-air-wing.
Averill M. Law. Simulation Modeling and Analysis. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY,
fifth edition, 2015. ISBN 978-0-07-340132-4.
Lockheed Martin Public Relations. U.S. Air Force Authorizes Extended Service
Life for F-16, 2017. URL https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2017-04-12-U-
S-Air-Force-Authorizes-Extended-Service-Life-for-F-16.
Denise Lu and Chris Alcantara. After Maria, Puerto Ricos electric-
ity grid is still recovering - Washington Post, 2018. URL https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/puerto-rico-
hurricane-recovery/?utm_term=.3daf5c2a2589.
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